

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO 37
Cambridge University Press, London, N.W. 1, England
W. J. Gage & Co., Limited, Toronto 2B, Canada

PEACE, SECURITY
&
THE UNITED NATIONS

Edited by
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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO • ILLINOIS

THE
NORMAN WAIT HARRIS MEMORIAL FOUNDATION

The Twenty-first Institute

HANS J. MORGENTHAU • DIRECTOR

THE Harris Foundation Lectures at the University of Chicago have been made possible through the generosity of the heirs of Norman Wait Harris and Emma Gale Harris, who donated to the University a fund to be known as "The Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation" on January 27, 1923. The letter of gift contains the following statement:

The purpose of the foundation shall be the promotion of a better understanding on the part of American citizens of the other peoples of the world, thus establishing a basis for improved international relations and a more enlightened world-order. The aim shall always be to give accurate information, not to propagate opinion.

Annual Institutes have been held at the University of Chicago since the summer of 1924. The lectures delivered each year have been published in essentially their original form in a series of volumes of which this is the most recent.

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Published 1946. Second Impression 1947. Composed and printed by
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, Chicago, Illinois, U. S. A.*

PREFACE

THE Twenty-first Institute of the Norman Wait Harris Foundation met July 9-13, 1945, to discuss "The United Nations and the Organization of Peace and Security." At the same time, the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate convened to consider the ratification of the Charter of the United Nations. Both groups dealt with the same subject matter, in so far as they endeavored to ascertain the importance of the United Nations Charter for the future legal and political development of the world. The Institute considered also certain specific political problems, such as the treatment of former enemy powers, commercial policy, and international communications which naturally were not the object of Senate discussion at that particular moment.

It is worthy of note that the hearings of the Senate committee, as well as the lectures given at the Institute and, more particularly, its round-table discussions, revealed the same cleavage of opinion with regard to the legal and political meaning and potentialities of the United Nations Charter. There were those who expected much of the United Nations Organization; there were those who expected little of it. There were those who thought that the new organization would, or at least could, usher in a new era of international relations, superseding the era of national sovereignty; and there were those who were convinced that it would be unable to affect the traditional structure of international poli-

PREFACE

tics. An interesting comment upon the relativity of political standpoints was provided by the fact that in the Senate committee the optimists with regard to the Charter were its foes, while its supporters minimized its effects, and that in the Institute it was just the other way around. Regardless of this strange juxtaposition, however, this cleavage of opinion sheds an illuminating light upon the state of American public opinion with regard to international affairs and upon the nature of those international problems themselves.

When, in the period between the two world wars, scholars and practitioners of international affairs tried to assess the possibilities of establishing peace and security under the Covenant of the League of Nations, most of them approached the legal and political problems in the same spirit in which the legal practitioner would approach a private contract or a piece of domestic legislation. They would examine the legal documents and from their wording ascertain the range of the legal rights and obligations stipulated therein. This legalistic, positivist approach to the problems of international law and organization leads, of necessity, to an optimistic approach to the problems of international politics; for, since it takes the stipulations of rights and duties contained in international legal documents at their face value, it cannot fail to attribute maximum efficiency to them and, conversely, to minimize the importance of autonomous political factors.

It is a significant fact, revealed most strikingly in the deliberations of this Institute, that this school of thought no longer dominates American thinking on foreign affairs without serious challenge. The lessons of the

PREFACE

declining years of the League of Nations, of the great debate between isolationism and internationalism, and of the second World War itself have not been lost upon the younger generation of American students of international affairs. For this new school of thought international treaties of a political nature derive their meaning not from their text alone but from their text in conjunction with the political considerations which gave rise to them and which continue to determine their functions for the relations between nations. The Charter of the United Nations, then, may mean different things according to the political intentions of the nations supporting it and according to the political developments which will occur in the future. This school of thought, therefore, is of necessity neither optimistic nor pessimistic with regard to the importance of the United Nations Charter for the peace and security of the world; for it recognizes that the future of the Charter will primarily depend not upon the Charter itself but upon political developments which will take place quite independently of the Charter.

It seems, therefore, appropriate that the lectures printed on the following pages should not deal only with the legal and organizational aspects of peace and security in the postwar world but also with the concrete political factors upon which the legal and organizational developments envisaged at San Francisco will largely depend. This tendency was again particularly strong in the round tables which dealt with the following topics: "Purposes and Principles of the San Francisco Proposals" (Hans J. Morgenthau, University of Chicago); "Comparison of the San Francisco Proposals with the League of Nations" (Harold S. Quigley, University of Minne-

PREFACE

sota"; "Administrative Organization" (Arthur Sweetser, president, Woodrow Wilson Foundation); "The Problem of Germany" (Quincy Wright, University of Chicago); "The Problem of Japan" (Joe J. Mickle, president, Centenary College of Louisiana); "Settlement of Disputes and Peaceful Change" (Pitman B. Potter, managing editor, *American Journal of International Law*); "Use of Force and Suppression of Aggression" (Bernard Brodie, Yale University); "Human Rights and the International Order" (Philip C. Jessup, Columbia University); "Commercial Policy in the Postwar World" (Jacob Viner, University of Chicago); "The Farmer and the Worker" (Carter Goodrich, Columbia University); "Freedom of Communication" (James L. Fly, formerly chairman, Federal Communications Commission); "Dependent Peoples" (Quincy Wright, University of Chicago). By thus combining the traditional approach with a new concern for the concrete political problems which face the United States and the world, the Twenty-first Institute of the Norman Wait Harris Foundation hopes to contribute its share to the advancement of the science of international relations, as well as to the political education of the public at large.

HANS J. MORGENTHAU

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
October 1945

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POWER AND JUSTICE	11
<i>Percy E. Corbett, Professor of Government and International Relations, Yale University</i>	
THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS	25
<i>Arthur Robert Burns, Professor of Economics, Columbia University</i>	
GREAT POWERS AND SMALL STATES	57
<i>Malbone W. Graham, Professor of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles</i>	
REGIONALISM AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE	83
<i>Frederick L. Schuman, Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government, Williams College</i>	
WORLD ORGANIZATION ON THE ECONOMIC FRONTS	107
<i>Eugene Staley, Director, San Francisco Bay Region Division, Institute of Pacific Relations</i>	
INDEX	131

POWER AND JUSTICE

By PERCY E. CORBETT

THE Preamble to the San Francisco Charter asserts that "we, the peoples of the United Nations" are "determined" *inter alia* to "establish conditions under which *justice* . . . can be maintained." Article 1 declares it to be one of the purposes of the United Nations "to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of *justice* and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace." In Article 2 all members undertake to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, and security, and *justice*, are not endangered." Article 7 declares that an International Court of *Justice* is established as one of the "principal organs of the United Nations"; and Articles 92-96, together with an amended statute, make detailed provisions for the creation and work of this court.

Some of this emphasis on "justice" was in response to a criticism leveled at the Dumbarton Oaks text, not only in a number of the smaller countries, but in the United States as well. The complaint was that the general objectives and standards of the proposed organization had not been explicitly stated and that, notably, any general dedication to "justice" was lacking. Apparently, these repeated references to "justice" convey some

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

greater sense of safety to the small nations, who, far more than the great, are intrusting themselves to the direction of the new league. They have served the additional purpose of pleasing important political figures in this country by identifying the organization with a symbol which, though uncertain and changing in content, is nevertheless in constant popular use.

In any event we are assured, so far as paper and print can assure us, that, in the future, power is to be used with "justice" in the relations of states. It becomes important, therefore, to inquire how far any concept or concepts that may be set forth in this word "justice" can serve as a norm to control action in the United Nations.

We must ask, first, whether the word carries any common meaning to the fifty nations who signed the Charter and—most important—how much common meaning, if any, it conveys to the five greater states who will, in all important matters, decide what the United Nations shall do.

Few individuals or groups ever admit, at least in public, that anything they are attempting to do is not just. One frequent meaning of the word, then, is what the speaker wants. It is a fact, however, that men can and do become indignant at what they regard as injustice to others. I will leave it to the prevailing psychological school at this place and moment to say whether this is always because they discern a threat to themselves. It is also a fact that most of us are accustomed to having the realization of our desires limited by the claims of others. In a word, we live more or less contentedly in society and accept for most purposes the highest common mul-

POWER AND JUSTICE

tiple of desires which forms the standard of justice in our society. When we get worked up about what we believe to be a defect in this standard, we may set about getting the standard modified. We know that the prevailing notion of what is just has changed a great deal in our own society, and we know that our prevailing notion does not correspond in all details with the notions prevailing in other societies.

Knowing these things, we might be expected to be on guard against any expectation that "justice" will mean the same thing over any great period of time or among any large variety of societies. It is true that we can give definitions of justice that will be at least formally accepted by a large number of nations. On examination they prove too abstract to mean much in actual value to the human being. Thus most peoples will exalt the dignity of the individual and his right to self-development—but only within the law, and the law can vary from light to darkness even among states formally friendly to one another. Equality of individuals before the law is another proposition stoutly asserted in most states, but only for such rights as the law allows to the particular individual or the group in which he is classified. Even the procedural equality which this principle of "justice" seems to promise may be cut in upon by costs and rules as to sureties which create a substantial difference of position.

One effort to discover an irreducible common content in concepts of justice focuses on the notion of equality. The essence of justice, it is said, is that equal things should be treated equally. But until you have answered the question what things are regarded as equal in any

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

given society, you tell us nothing of the meaning of justice in that society in terms of what actually happens to the individual. This does not mean that the concept of equality is without value. It only means that it is another abstraction that needs authoritative and specific interpretation to give it substance.

In this realm it is peculiarly true that interpretation and application matter more than any agreed principle. Indeed, a most important part of the prevailing notion of justice within a great many states is equality or impartiality of procedure. In a word, there is less possibility here than in some other matters of making any useful distinction between principle and practice. This ought to be constantly borne in mind; for it will become important in the course of our discussion.

Hitherto, we have been dealing with notions of justice as between man and man. We must cross over now to justice between state and state—international justice. This is, of course, the justice principally invoked in the San Francisco Charter, though that instrument also promises some systematic effort to foster, in the form of “fundamental rights,” a higher common standard of justice as between man and man.

That relatively weak and uncertain body of principles by which governments are partially guided in their action on behalf of the state, and which is known as “international law” or the “law of nations,” is theoretically based on notions of justice said to be common to the family or community of nations. Because there is no single human authority to which all states are subject, this body of principles has lacked not only an organized machinery of enforcement but also a mechanism of im-

POWER AND JUSTICE

perative statement and interpretation. Failing such mechanism of statement, interpretation, and enforcement, jurists have had to rely throughout the whole development of international law, more than in any national system, upon asserted principles of universal validity variously attributed for their origin to God, nature, the long-established practice of states, or some vague general reason said to lie behind all law. All these efforts to underpin an international code are essentially arguments by analogy from past or existing national legal systems.

The alleged community of states is an analogy, imperfect as analogies always are, from the national community. The uncertainties of its law and the irregularity of enforcement are often hopefully ascribed to the primitive character of this community. Actually, of course, as we know very well from anthropological studies, a striking characteristic of primitive, as contrasted with civilized, communities is the greater uniformity of their standards and conduct. The only real similarity between the primitive and the international community is the absence of clearly defined agencies for legislation, adjudication, and execution. As a fairly efficient substitute for these agencies, primitive society had its settled and enforced mores. The mores of the international society are less settled and less regularly enforced.

I have already noted the tendency of the individual to identify justice with his own needs or desires. The strength of this tendency is multiplied in those groups which we call nations or states. Not only is there less sense of community between these collective entities than between members of the same national community,

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

but moral considerations—which some refuse to identify with community considerations—exercise much less influence on the conduct of national groups than on the conduct of individuals. It is a patriotic habit to make a virtue of selfishness (which I would call “short-range calculation”) in the state.

This being so, we must certainly not expect to find any more common content in the various national concepts of what is just for states—in other words, international justice—than in the various national concepts of justice for the individual. This is particularly true when we descend from the level of high abstraction to that of actual cases. A few examples taken more or less at random will prove that point.

Let us look, for instance, at the different convictions as between France and England in the 1920's regarding what constituted just treatment of Germany. We are, of course, not concerned here at all with the respective merits of these convictions. Let us look, if we prefer current history, at the different convictions of the same two countries in regard to what constitutes a just settlement of the claims of Syria and Lebanon to independence.

Let us take, finally, a far more inclusive example. The five great powers have set the limits of justice in the community of the United Nations. The middle and small states quite obviously did not regard it as just that the great should be exempt from sanctions which will be applicable to the small. They do not like a system which enables any one of the five leaders to stop the process of justice the moment it becomes uncomfortable. But, hoping for increased security, they ceded to power, recognizing that justice by standards acceptable to all

POWER AND JUSTICE

states is politically impossible in a society in which certain members are strong enough to reject social control.

The community of states is, of course, far from being the only community in which might tends to determine what is right. It is the governing group in any community which fixes the enforceable standard of justice, and this group may be larger or smaller. In every community there is some nongoverning group which regards the situation as unjust—appeals, in other words, to something other than the working standard. Looking in from outside, the spectator will hold the community justly or unjustly governed according to his own standard of justice. He may call it a just regime, even though the majority does not regard the situation as ideal but merely accepts it as the best now obtainable. Thus, so long as the lesser states in the United Nations get the added security for which they accepted a qualification of their alleged equality, many observers will consider this a productive compromise involving no substantial injustice.

Others, realizing how precarious this security is, will regard its very dependence on the will of the great states as essentially an injustice.

In my view the term "justice" is appropriate only to communities a good deal more highly integrated than the United Nations. A unified working concept of justice, as distinguished from a paper abstraction, exists only where there is a highly developed sense of community; and the equal application of the common standard implies a monopoly of judgment and a monopoly of force in the community as an entity.

It would be easy to set out here a dozen definitions of

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

justice by philosophers from Plato to our own times. Let us take only one. It is from an excellent book, *Justice and World Society*, published in 1944 by Miss Laurence Stapleton. She says: "The essence of justice consists in the transcendence . . . of our own interests, not in such a manner that they are neglected, but . . . that room is created for others as well as ourselves to provide for basic needs." Socrates, you may remember, also made justice a personal attitude or practice, which for him consisted in doing one's own job and not interfering in the jobs of others. For Miss Stapleton this subjective attitude and practice is achieved only by a "continuous objective reference." It requires an "impersonal power of comparison," which she derives from such an ideal as the law of nature. This, she believes, reveals "a manner of fair dealing and of generosity towards one another that all human beings can understand and value."

I am in grave doubt about this. The evidence seems to me largely lacking, and I do not have Miss Stapleton's faith in moral perceptions that are "independent of scientific or historical knowledge."

I have been discussing justice not so much as a personal attitude and more as a condition which may or may not exist in a community but which is always dependent on the existence of a community. The condition is brought into existence as a result of personal attitudes and practice; but I find the mainspring of such practice not in any transcendence of our own interest but only in experience and calculation as to the best way of creating a society in which we like to live. The difference between justice and injustice for me is mainly a difference be-

POWER AND JUSTICE

tween short-term and long-term, or unintelligent and intelligent, calculation of our own interest. The longer-range calculation inevitably involves more consideration of the interests of others, but consideration of the interests of others as factors bearing on our chances of getting what we want for ourselves. This approach to justice avoids the invocation of absolutes, universal purposes, or universally and eternally valid values. There is no sphere in which man has caused himself more suffering than in the sphere of international relations by his habit of identifying his own desires with higher purposes and absolutes.

Long-term calculation is more difficult for states than for individuals, owing to the variety of pressures on the decision-maker and to the human habit of demanding of governments a short-sighted concentration on immediate national or group interests.

The ideas of international justice (that is, the ideas as to what will constitute the best living conditions in the international society) which will count most in the United Nations will be those shared and jointly indorsed by the United States, Britain, and Russia. If we scan the relations of those states and contemplate the differences in social and political values which characterize their methods of government and their outlook on the world, we may be very skeptical about the reality of any useful and operative common concept. Americans and British will find considerable common ground in what we may call the "democratic values." There will be some difference in detail as to how these work out in the relations of states. We shall not always agree on what constitutes

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

freedom, free popular choice of government, equality of opportunity or status. But the differences in detail as between the Soviet Union, on the one side, and the United States and Britain, on the other, are clearly likely to be much greater. And let us remember, in making our calculations, that the Russians are quite as much entitled as we are to their own system of values.

Happily we have something better to go to, in our search for common American-Russian-British principles of international action, than two decades of chronic conflict and distrust. It is true that partnership in war has by no means ended our differences and our distrust. Let us remember again that a detached observer, equally indifferent to both sides, would not necessarily find on the record that the Russians had any greater reason to trust us than we to trust them. Neither has the San Francisco Conference stilled all fear and suspicion. Nothing will do that but actual experience in fruitful collaboration.

But the San Francisco Conference did do something of first-rate importance. It laid out the terms and designed the machinery for productive collaboration. The terms include the statement of standards which are, happily, at least one degree more concrete than "justice." In ratifying the Charter we all agree that force is not to be used against the territorial integrity and political independence of states; we agree to settle our disputes by peaceful means; and we pledge ourselves to respect "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."

Here, I say, is one more degree of concreteness. It is

POWER AND JUSTICE

by no means a sufficient degree to eliminate doubt and controversy. The agencies of interpretation and enforcement, designed to deal with such controversies, have not the obligatory or coercive power that those of the state have over individuals. There is here no monopoly of judgment or of force in the United Nations as one entity. In particular, it cannot operate against any one of the five permanent members of the security council. It cannot, in other words, impose any limitation upon power at the precise points where it is most needed.

We must assume—and must act on the assumption, until the contrary is shown—that the obligations of the Charter were seriously undertaken and will be carried out in good faith. But what will the obligations mean in any particular concrete case?

Here we may derive help from the new International Court of Justice. A permanent international court is, of all present possibilities, the agency that can do most for the realization of a common standard of justice in the relations of states. There is an accepted tradition of democracy in judicial decision. The opinion of a judge in an international court is just one vote whether he comes from a great or a small state. Moreover, the court, in addition to settling disputes, furnishes us over the years with the most authoritative statement of the common element in the various concepts of justice.

Unfortunately, while the proceedings of the Permanent Court of International Justice were marked by equality of voice and governed by the democratic principle of majority, they were not quite judicial in all aspects. The appointment of *ad hoc* national judges, in-

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

stead of the withdrawal from the bench of nationals of parties before the court, perpetuated the nonjudicial principle of representation and jeopardized that impartiality and detachment which, in the national sphere, have become a common element of the concept of justice. Unhappily again, the new International Court of Justice preserves this vice. It flows from the attachment of states to their sovereignty and their continuing distrust of one another. Finally, the new court, like its predecessor, will have no compulsory jurisdiction.

So long as we refuse to submit to impartial adjudication any dispute, no matter how much it concerns us, we are refusing to accept in the international sphere one of the essential parts of the concept of justice which obtains within our national community. We cannot defend the refusal, without equally rejecting the national standard of justice, by insisting that there are certain values we cannot risk, because our national standard of justice itself demands the community determination of what values shall prevail.

This is not a plea for world federation. I would have great misgivings about a monopoly of force in a universal government until we have gone much further in the development of common values. This, I hope, may not take the five hundred years prescribed by a distinguished member of this university. I agree with him, however, that it is beyond the present limits of useful planning. But, precisely for the discovery and definition of common values, I believe we have reached the stage where we should accept adjudication of all international disputes without exception. In the growth of civilized communities the establishment of a legal obligation to

POWER AND JUSTICE

submit to impartial judgment, and of a legal obligation to satisfy judgment, has historically preceded the state's intervention either to compel appearance before its tribunals or to enforce their judgments. The body of the law, constituting a crystallization of common values, grows before the mechanism of its enforcement.

I am facing quite frankly the possibility that we might be placed in the position of having to choose between refusal to observe a judgment, on the one hand, and the sacrifice of something nationally regarded as a supreme value, on the other. If that happened, we would resist, and we would be in the position of an outlaw. The risk would exist; but I have sufficient faith in our values, as they would be interpreted by majority judgment in the kind of tribunal that we could now establish, to believe that the risk would be worth taking. It would be worth taking as the best method of winning wider recognition of the values which I hope and believe we will champion.

Turning back, in conclusion, to the point from which we started, we may ask why the small nations should have derived any comfort from the addition of the word "justice" to the Charter. Apparently they thought they were making at least a step toward the prevention of the arbitrary use of power by the great states. Coupled with the other provisions of the text, even so indefinite a limitation gives them something on which to base their claim to a day in some kind of forum, pleading for justice as they see it. But do not let us in our complacency forget that what they get at the end of their day will still depend on the fickle benevolence of the powerful. It will take many steps beyond the San Francisco Charter before this frail protection becomes

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

dependable. As the first of these, I propose that we should aim at fuller jurisdiction and a more impartial composition for the International Court of Justice. We shall not easily or immediately persuade either the United States or the Soviet Union to accept compulsory jurisdiction. But the objective is not so remote that it can be dismissed as visionary. It is important enough to challenge the effort of men of good will.

THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS

By ARTHUR ROBERT BURNS

THE last five years have demonstrated man's capacity for destruction. Western civilization, as we have known it, has indeed narrowly escaped destruction. It has been seriously damaged. But, on the other hand, the war has generated more serious and more widely supported efforts than ever before to prevent major wars. The United Nations at the San Francisco Conference set up international machinery for preventing and, if necessary, suppressing aggression. At the same time, the great powers, having compelled, by military force, the unconditional surrender of Germany, must determine the policies to be followed in Germany so long as they are responsible for its government, and the conditions under which sovereignty shall later be returned to Germany and Japan.

The great powers are now faced with the largest task of social engineering ever undertaken. Indeed, reflection upon the problem leads one to feel, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, "like a weak solution of oneself." Yet, unless Germany and Japan can be converted from attitudes hospitable to war as an enterprise both noble in itself and essential to maintain the virility of a national state, the United Nations Organization will fail.

The policy of the three great powers regarding Germany was announced at the Crimea Conference in the following words:

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

"It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German general staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans and a place for them in the comity of nations."

This policy consists of three elements, namely, economic and industrial disarmament, reparation, and denazification. On all three of these policies the Crimea declaration was necessarily general. Our main problem is to give them specific content. This task will call for all the wisdom and all the technical, political, economic, and psychological knowledge that we can bring to bear upon it.

Those who do not wish to see the resurgence of the Nazi state and its equivalent in Japan have many dif-

THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS

ferences of opinion, but there is almost unanimous agreement that we must act so as to eliminate the will to aggression. This is the heart of the problem. This will is, to my mind, no recent development generated by the Nazi party, nor is it the inevitable accompaniment of so-called "late capitalism." It is not, in the main, the outcome of economic distress in Germany and Japan, although a people not disinclined for war may more quickly gird themselves for the attack if war seems to promise economic relief. The basic difficulty, in both Germany and Japan, seems to derive from attitudes so prevalent as to be an inherent part of their national personalities, if the term may be permitted.

These attitudes may be briefly summarized by saying that the Germans and Japanese have, more than other peoples, developed an authoritarian state and have been powerfully swayed by appeals for the enhancement of its power and prestige. War has been accepted both as an essential instrument of policy and as a test of the virility of the state. The military profession and the social classes most closely associated with it have enjoyed a prestige disproportionate to their importance as agents of national defense. The German nation has experienced the need to feel superior to other nations and, consequently, has been unable to co-operate with them on equal terms. The heroic military virtues, in the last analysis displayed adequately only in war, have been held up as a dominant ideal for German and Japanese manhood. But whatever moral value attaches to these ideas, the conflict between them and the policies of the Allies has caused a disastrous fissure in modern society. Being incompatible with international stability, these

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

attitudes must be removed. Changes in the economic and political organization of Germany and Japan and reparation for war damage by these countries must all be regarded as means to the removal of the will to aggression rather than as ends in themselves.

As our end is psychological, we might approach it by psychological means, such as the reformation of education, the press, and the radio. Doubtless, much is needed in these fields. But I am convinced that our action with regard to disarmament, reparation, and denazification will be the most important parts of any re-education of enemy countries. Not only must we say loud and long that we hate war; we must also act rigorously and consistently like people who hate war, and who hate it enough to stay with the unpleasant and arduous job of removing the stimuli and the power to make war.

But our rigor must be in the application of policies that can, with conviction, be explained to the people of the Allied nations, as well as to those of enemy countries, as steps essential to the prevention of aggression. If we are not convinced, and if divisions of opinion arise among the peoples of the United Nations, we shall falter in our attitude to the enemy countries. They will be encouraged to believe that we subconsciously share their attitude that war is an enterprise worthy of, and even essential to, vigorous peoples and that those who lose wars should be treated with chivalry. The enemy peoples will not then put away thoughts of war. Next time with just a little more luck they may be the victors. A sense of guilt can develop among the United Nations, because we seem in time of peace to lose our hold on the high ideals we expressed in time of war. Such a relapse may

THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS

come either because we do not pursue our objectives vigorously enough or because we pursue them so vigorously as to violate the moral values for which we have fought.

Discussion of each of the three policies announced at the Crimea Conference will demonstrate the consequences of approaching them in this spirit and indicate in fairly concrete terms the actions that seem to be necessary to secure our objectives.

The policy which should take precedence over all other considerations, in the event of conflict, is that of disarming the enemy countries. I do not propose to discuss the desirability of such a policy because I doubt whether there is any important body of opinion opposing disarmament. Methods of carrying out this policy do, however, call for much consideration. Discussions of a "hard" versus a "soft" peace usually turn, I believe, on the extensiveness of the interference with German and Japanese economic life necessary to minimize the prospect of recurrent aggression by these countries.

Industrial and economic controls in these countries might be restricted to the prevention of the manufacture of arms, the arms now in the possession of these countries being also destroyed. Rigorous and persistent action along these lines would, undoubtedly, prevent aggression. Such a policy was announced after 1918, and war was not, in fact, prevented. But the resurgence of German aggression was due, not to the ineffectiveness of the policy, but to the fact that it was never really tried. But I doubt whether it would now be adequate if it were tried. The definition of arms and munitions is not easy. Does it include apparently civilian aircraft and chemi-

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

cals used for poison gas and explosives but also with civilian uses? Strict enforcement upon an unwilling people is difficult because of the ease of evasion. The manufacture of weapons in plants apparently engaged upon peaceful production is difficult to detect. Apparently, the Norwegian underground, for instance, was able to manufacture arms for its own use even under the supervision of the Nazis. The simplicity of some of the more recent and deadly means of offense increases the dangerous possibilities of evasion in the future.

But the most serious objection to a policy thus restricted is that, given a broad industrial base, a country can build up a powerful arms industry in two or three years, as the United States and Great Britain have done. Any slackening of control over armament production, narrowly defined, might permit rearmament to achieve a momentum difficult to stop when its power was realized. But if the industrial base of the armament industries is removed, a much longer period is necessary to arm. Plant and equipment must be built. Even more important, engineering and laboring skill must be developed. If the industrial base of the armament industries is removed for a long time, the development of these skills is slow and difficult without outside help.

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the removal from Germany and Japan of the industries most directly contributory to aggression will necessitate the development of these industries in other countries. Thereby the industrial disparity between the enemy countries and their potential victims is doubly reduced. More than the mere prohibition of the production of weapons is necessary to give mankind a reasonable mar-

THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS

gin of safety against the devastation that must be expected from another war a generation hence.

At the other extreme we might endeavor to eliminate from enemy countries all the economic and industrial activities that have contributed to aggression. No such policy seems to be feasible. "Total war" means the devotion to war, directly or indirectly, of all the resources of a nation. Industrial activities essential to the peaceful life of a nation have been turned directly to war through the uses to which their products have been put (e.g., steel, machine tools, clothing, food, and fuel) or the conversion of their facilities to make war products (e.g., the machinery industries generally). Little would be left as a basis for maintaining the population of the enemy countries. The more narrow the range of activities permitted in enemy countries, the more must they import goods to keep their peoples alive. But they will have to pay for imports with exports, a problem to which I will revert later.

In fact, there seems to be no practical alternative to a course falling between these two extremes. The manufacture of arms must be prohibited. But prohibitions and restrictions must go further. Industries developed in enemy countries without economic justification but for the support of the armed forces should be closed down. Industries protected by heavy tariffs, those maintained by subsidies direct or indirect, and those whose markets have otherwise been maintained by authoritarian regulation fall into this category. It would include, for instance, the manufacture of crude aluminum, synthetic oil, and synthetic rubber in Germany, as well as a number of other industrial activities. Autarchy was

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

pursued explicitly to render Germany independent of foreign supplies and so to increase its war potential. The removal of these industries will, in the long run, increase both security and economic well-being. But, in addition, there are industries so essential to modern war, or so easily convertible to its purposes, that they should be removed, even if efficiently located in Germany or Japan. The aircraft industry of Germany is likely to be an example, as well as some branches of the chemical industry. Supplies of the products of these industries needed for peaceful living in Germany would have to be imported, subject to control by the great powers to prevent stockpiling or rearmament.

There is also a number of industries essential to peace but whose expansion beyond a size necessary to meet the requirements of peacetime living (including peaceful foreign trade) must be regarded as militaristic. Their expansion may have been for the purpose of making potential victims dependent upon enemy countries for supplies of strategically important materials, as well as to insure a supply for Germany and Japan. This group of industries should, therefore, be restricted to the size necessary to meet the peaceful requirements of these countries. Parts of the German steel and chemical industries might fall into this class. There are, however, many practical difficulties in deciding which industries fall into this category and how much to allow for the peaceful requirements of the enemy countries. But these are more in the nature of difficult detail than problems of principle.

The means by which the desired ends shall be achieved are of less importance on this occasion than the

THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS

ends. The machinery of economic control that has developed in this country, Great Britain, and Germany to divert economic resources to the purposes of war follows a fairly uniform design which is likely to provide the pattern for controls over industry in the enemy countries. It is to be expected that there will be prohibition and curtailment orders affecting specified lines of productions. These orders are likely to be supplemented and enforced by controls over the allocation of a number of key materials.

The form of the controls may, however, be of considerable importance. Indeed, it is sometimes suggested that the substance of policy must be adapted to the form of controls. Lacking the endurance and interest to operate complex controls in enemy countries for a long time, we had better select policies that do not require much detailed machinery for enforcement. This contention amounts to an admission that we are not interested enough in preventing war at the end of another generation to do very much about it now. This is a policy of defeatism springing from moral bankruptcy. But we should, of course, seek the most economical means of achieving our objectives, partly to save our own resources and partly to throw upon enemy peoples as much responsibility as possible for making their way out of the ruins of war.

The disarmament of Germany might be achieved by detaching from Germany those territories in the east and the west that contain most of the heavy industries, such as Upper Silesia, the Rhine Valley, and the Ruhr Valley. Unfortunately, I cannot here deal with this proposal as it deserves. The detachment of these territories would

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

remove from German political control a large part of the vital resources for war. But the mere moving of customs houses and changing of flags would not achieve disarmament. First, this method is more likely to generate an irredentist movement than the imposition of controls over industry. The Germans, recalling pronouncements that the Allies were not fighting the war for territorial aggrandizement, might, if territory were detached, be united in a sense of national martyrdom—a state of mind into which they fall with the greatest of ease. They could, moreover, make a plausible appeal to liberal world opinion. They are likely to prefer industrial controls to separation of territory because the latter is more likely to be enduring than the former. But if separation of territory is the most feasible and effective means of disarmament, it should be adopted, and the Germans should be informed that the Allied policy seems to be the most rational method of effectuating their announced policy of depriving Germany of its war-making power.

But how feasible is such separation of territory as a means of disarmament? Disarmament would not be achieved if the economic resources in the separated areas were left under the control of former Germans, some of them Nazis and others with a history of close collaboration. The German population in detached territory would probably be strongly drawn to the rest of Germany. Full disarmament by this method would require that most of the population be removed to the rump Germany. In addition, it would require that property in the territory be taken away from German owners.

To these very serious problems would be added that of

THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS

bringing into the territory managerial and operating personnel to utilize its resources. If this were not done, it could be argued that the European economy was being unbalanced and, consequently, the European standard of living reduced. The argument has validity, though less than appears at first glance. The European, and indeed the world, economy has already been seriously distorted to meet the needs of war. The steel capacity of the world, for instance, will probably be greatly in excess of what can be used in times of peace for some years to come, even in an expanding world economy. The steel industry in the Ruhr Valley may be so badly smashed that there will be serious question as to whether it should be rehabilitated, especially as it is not clear that the industry is economically located there. Thus, it will not be easy to decide how much of the industry in such areas should, on economic grounds, be rehabilitated or to provide the personnel and capital for such rehabilitation as may seem desirable.

If this territory is no longer to be integrated with the rest of Germany, with whom is it to trade? This question must be answered to frame the international commercial policy of the area and to select the country to which, if any, the territory is to be attached. The concentration of heavy industry in the Ruhr Valley and the Rhineland, for instance, requires a large market. France alone could not provide a large enough market and could not be expected to take the military risk of dependence upon such a peripheral territory for so strategic a sort of supply. Western Europe as a whole seems to be politically unprepared to take collective responsibility for the area. International control might blunt the edge of German

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

criticism that the Allies were using their victory to seize territory. But the interests of the co-operating powers are likely to be sharply divergent. Some would wish to see the area eliminated as a competitor on foreign markets. Others would like to use it as a source of supply.

Decisions regarding the separation of territory are likely, in fact, to rest upon military and political considerations. But the acceptance of such separation as a means of disarmament should depend upon the method of separation and, particularly, upon the treatment of German property and population in the territory.

The separation of territory is likely to play a much larger part in the disarmament of Japan than of Germany. The great powers declared, at Cairo, on December 1, 1943, that Japan was to be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which it had seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914. All the territories which Japan has stolen from China, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, are to be restored to China. Japan is also to be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence or greed. Korea is to become, in due course, free and independent. Very few of the industries or materials needed for war would be left to Japan if, in addition, protected industries were removed from the Japanese islands. But here, too, the development of the resources of the detached areas will present difficult problems if the Japanese population, and especially the Japanese technicians, are removed. Furthermore, the removal of the Japanese population would be especially difficult.

Control of imports has also been suggested as a means of disarming the enemy countries. It is a curious fact

THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS

that both Germany and Japan are dependent upon foreign supplies for most of the materials of war. Germany, for instance, possesses ample coal and about one-third of the iron ore it needs. Of the remaining strategic materials, it possesses none or grossly inadequate quantities. It is wholly or in large part dependent on imports or synthetic supplies of petroleum, copper, manganese, nickel, lead, zinc, chrome, and bauxite (for aluminum). Japan proper has few of the natural resources needed for war, other than copper. To keep its steel industry fully employed, it must obtain from the mainland 70 per cent of its coking coal and 80 per cent of its iron ore. Its aluminum industry depends almost entirely on imported materials.

Control of imports will undoubtedly be necessary, but it is doubtful whether, standing alone, it would be an effective means of disarmament. During the years immediately following surrender, there will be large supplies of scrap metal difficult to control, although the dangers of rearmament are not great during this period. But later there are likely to be mineral-producing countries anxious to dispose of their product who might wink at smuggling into Germany. Iron ore, bauxite, and similar bulky materials are not easy to smuggle in important quantities, but the main difficulty about reliance upon import controls as the sole means of disarmament is that it involves far more control of the German economy than is realized. If imports are to be limited to the peaceful requirements of the country, all users must prove their peacetime requirements and show that past supplies have, in fact, been used only for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, the controlling powers, having set ceilings

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

upon German imports, must also set ceilings upon imports from each country, a delicate and difficult task. Unless this were done, exporting countries would have no means of knowing whether they were assisting Germany to evade the control placed upon it. In fact, reliance upon import controls alone is likely to leave to Germany excessive opportunity for evasion and to expose other countries to opportunities for mutual friction, thus arousing hope in Germany that the Allied controls can be circumvented. Import controls may, however, play a major part in the control of Japanese rearmament.

Up to this point I have discussed disarmament on the assumption that the Allied powers will be in complete control of the enemy countries. Sometime or other, however, fuller control must be handed over to an indigenous government. Any increase in the powers of the government in matters affecting disarmament should, however, await strong evidence that greater authority will not be used for purposes of aggression. When this will happen it is now impossible to forecast. But we cannot postpone the drafting of a longer-run policy. A draft of this policy is necessary as a guide to the slow modification of policy during the period of occupation. It is even more necessary to communicate the outlines of longer-run plans to the enemy peoples in order to eliminate major uncertainties that might encourage them to postpone their adjustment to the ways of peace.

The increase in the powers of the enemy governments should not take the form of permission to produce weapons of war. Rather it is to be hoped that other countries will, in due time, bring their own expenditure upon armament down toward the level in enemy coun-

THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS

tries, namely, almost zero. It would also be undesirable to permit the readoption of policies of autarchy. Activities clearly not defensible on economic grounds should continue to be prohibited. But such prohibitions will not easily be defended by the imposing powers unless they adopt a similar policy. Doubtless the argument that infant industries must be protected in enemy countries will persist to plague us. But this problem is not insoluble if it is proposed to protect only temporarily industries that have a reasonable prospect of growing up to independent adulthood.

Beyond these controls to prohibit the production of weapons of war and the development of an autarchic state, little interference seems to be justified, once Germany and Japan have shown that they have abandoned their admiration of, and hope of gain from, war. There will be activities that will present difficulties, more particularly the operation of marine and air fleets. Other countries already active in these fields will be tempted to keep the enemy powers out. But prior occupation of the field would seem to give other countries a considerable and sufficient advantage. In the last resort, decisions must rest upon judgments as to the intentions of the enemy powers at the time decisions must be made.

The primary instrument for control at this stage would seem to be a treaty setting out a list of economic activities that are prohibited. Engagement in these activities would be regarded as an act of war. Thus the enemy powers would be exposed to much severer tests regarding acts of aggression than other countries. But, of course, no such treaty can be negotiated until Germany has lost its reputation for making treaties to de-

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

ceive other countries and for renouncing them whenever renunciation seems to be in the German interest.

Although there is little danger of aggression by Germany for a generation, it is of the utmost importance that whatever disarmament measures are decided upon should be applied as soon as possible. Unless Allied pronouncements regarding the treatment of Germany are followed up quickly with action consistent with these declarations, disarmament will strike the German people after they have had time to generate the hope that once again the Allies did not mean what they said. Germans will begin to cherish the hope that, at least subconsciously, the Allies believe that Germany put up a brave fight for the fatherland and one of which it has no reason to be ashamed. If productive facilities ultimately to be closed down are kept in operation for a time, part of the German population will become dependent upon them for employment. The occupying forces may flinch from action that will cause unemployment and add to their difficulties. Yet such action must be contemplated, and better sooner than later. If the facilities are used to provide export goods for reparation or otherwise, countries that have become dependent upon these industries will also resent their closing.

Most of the differences of opinion on disarmament depend upon assumptions regarding the economic base that will be left in enemy countries. If the Germans, for instance, must contemplate unbearable conditions of life, disarmament will ultimately fail. Denied hope, the Germans will be unified in despair. They will fight for survival. Moreover, the great powers announced at the

THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS

Crimea Conference that "it is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany."

In the long run the enemy countries are likely to benefit economically from policies preventing them from diverting their resources to war. The elimination of activities based on autarchic, rather than economic, considerations will mean the more efficient use of their resources and a higher standard of living. The elimination of a way of life whereby a considerable proportion of the produce of their labor is used for war will also benefit them economically. But disarmament may require the elimination or curtailment in enemy countries of some activities which are also important for peace and which they can undertake economically. But in both Germany and Japan it seems likely that the number of such industries will be small. Any losses due to this cause must be written off against the much larger gains to these countries and to the world in general.

But it would be fatal to promise these benefits to Germany in the immediate future. The promise could not be fulfilled; and if fulfilment were possible, it would be undesirable because it would save the Germans from facing the real costs of war. The immediate future must be a period of great economic stress in Germany because of the destruction incident to war and reparation by Germany and the cost of diverting the economy in the direction of peace. During this period, both in Germany and within the United Nations, emphasis must be placed on the reasons for the low standard of living rather than upon hopes for speedy improvement. Moreover, if Germany is to make all the reparation within its power, the short-term costs of diversion from warlike to

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

peaceful activities will fall ultimately upon countries receiving reparation and not upon Germany.

Time and capital will be needed to reconstruct the enemy economies along peaceful lines. But any argument that, for this reason, the former German economy, or most of it, should be restored must be rejected, even by peace-loving Germans. The existing system is so seriously damaged that considerable investment would be needed to place it in working order again. Furthermore, it would be possible to maintain such a restored system in reasonably full operation only if Germany were allowed to return to its former policies. Such a policy would be irrational even in militaristic terms because the manpower needed for war will be lacking for a generation. Losses from disarmament must be regarded—and particularly the Germans must be brought to regard them—as the cost of their past mistaken use of their resources rather than as a cost arbitrarily imposed upon them by the victors in the war.

But steps are necessary to inform the Germans as to the kinds of economic activity which they may undertake. At the outset these must include these activities necessary for them to maintain themselves on a bearable standard of living. Some of these may be the production of export goods with which to pay for imports to keep themselves going. The principal emphasis should be placed upon the production of consumer goods. The growth of these industries will bring to relative prosperity and prestige businessmen not closely identified with the nationalistic policies of the past. The men will have an economic interest in the maintenance of a peaceful economy. The provision of such goods will also arouse

THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS

in the Germans an interest in providing for their own material needs. Ascetic idealism inducing sacrifices for the sake of the greatness of the nation (measured by the degree in which it is feared abroad) is likely to wither. If Germans generally acquire a vested interest in a high-consumption economy, they will thereby erect an obstacle to future aggression. But until the specific prohibitions and curtailments to be placed upon Germany are clear, it is difficult to forecast how far permitted activities will provide employment for the population and upon what standard of living. But it must again be emphasized that, wherever there is doubt, reparation must provide the cushion between disarmament and the survival of the German people.

Thus it seems to me that disarmament of the enemy countries is a prerequisite to a peaceful world. This disarmament must include the removal of the industrial base of their war potential. In the short run, it will involve costs for the enemy countries, although much below what they would have been before the war, because of the already seriously damaged condition of their industries. In the long run, the enemy countries will benefit. But, whatever the cost, it will be far less than the cost of another war.

We must now turn from disarmament to reparation by enemy countries for the damage they have done during the war—the second of the policies listed above. Fundamentally, reparation can be regarded, like disarmament, as part of the process of re-education. Insistence upon reparation up to the limit of Germany's power will be one way of demonstrating to the Germans the cost of war, and one of the major reasons for the de-

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

sire of the Allies to prevent its recurrence. It is most unfortunate, however, that there is no way of bringing home to the Germans the cost of war to their victims in terms of death and human suffering.

Reparation for war is a subject almost as old as history. In ancient times the objective often seems to have been to destroy or take away as much as possible so as to leave the enemy weak for a long time. In other words, the objective was disarmament. During the last hundred years or so, reparations have been fixed in money, leaving the mechanism of foreign exchange and international lending to look after the real payment.

It is now a commonplace that this policy broke down after 1918. Countries were encouraged to evaluate the damage they had suffered and to expect full reparation for that damage. Claimant countries (principally France) pressed for payment in cash and refused reparation in labor and, with some exceptions, reparation in kind. In general, claimant countries were unwilling to permit the increases in German exports that would be necessary to convert financial reparation obligations into real reparation. After Germany had sold marks on a declining market, the Allies agreed to accept responsibility for converting marks into foreign exchange to pay reparation. But, in the long run, Germany borrowed abroad even more than was necessary to cover reparation payments, the costs of occupation, and the treaty obligations. Germany was able, while it was supposed to be paying reparations, to begin to modernize its industrial system and make considerable investments in public works. Such reparation as was received came not from Germany but from countries that made loans to it.

THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS

This discreditable farce does not, however, show that reparation cannot be made by a large industrial country. Industrialization, with its accompanying complication of national, social, and economic structures and of international relations, has deprived reparation of some of its earlier crude simplicity. If we say again that "Germany must pay," we must add to that statement that claimants must accept goods and services in payment.

The great powers announced at the Crimea Conference that Germany must make compensation in kind for the damage caused by Germany to the Allied nations in the war. Thus reparation policy so far stated is that the principle of reparation is accepted, that reparation must be made "to the greatest extent possible," and that reparation will be "in kind." As with the pronouncement regarding disarmament, this policy requires very considerable interpretation. This task has been handed over to a Reparation Commission now meeting in Moscow.

There is a number of reasons for believing that the farce of reparation after 1918 will not be re-enacted, although the devastation wrought in Germany by both the Allies and the Germans must reduce to a very low level Germany's ability to make reparation, especially in the immediate future. First, there will be much greater readiness to think of reparations in real terms, partly as a result of reflection upon the outcome of reparations policy after 1918 and partly because of the specific statement that reparation must this time be "in kind." Second, the country likely to be the largest single claimant (Russia) is a socialist state, able to control its resources. It can divert its own resources into constructive

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

purposes and maintain them in full use while also receiving benefit from reparation. Third, the devastation has been so much greater than after 1918 that other countries will be under pressure to make a greater effort than before to arrange their affairs so as to benefit from reparation. Fourth, the war has compelled most participating countries to establish centralized control of their economies, which controls they will probably be compelled to maintain at least for the period of more serious rehabilitation and reconstruction. This machinery can be used to facilitate their absorption of reparation. Fifth, reconstruction will temporarily require types of economic activity that can be provided out of reparation while the native labor force of the claimants is directed into activities the need for which is likely to be more sustained. Sixth, the Allies are likely to exercise far-reaching controls over German economic life, partly in order to insure disarmament. Seventh, more emphasis is likely to be placed on reparation in the form of production facilities and labor services than after 1918.

Ultimately, reparation claims must be the residual demands upon the German economy. Both disarmament and denazification must take precedence. Then Germany must be allowed to produce enough to keep itself going on a bearable standard of living. Failing provision for the population on such a level, epidemics and unrest are to be expected that will endanger the occupying forces. In the longer run, sustained depression in Germany will tend to continue the segregation of Germany from the world economy and preserve among Germans a sense of their solidarity as a nation, which will impede their ultimate integration into the world economy. Ger-

THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS

many must also provide as far as possible for the maintenance of the occupying forces. It must be disarmed, and the steps necessary to this end may reduce its capacity to make reparation. They will certainly reduce its capacity to make reparation in certain forms. Those responsible for Nazi policies must be removed from public and industrial life. Since many of these persons may be the most experienced administrators, both public and industrial, German efficiency may be thereby reduced. But as German efficiency is already greatly reduced by the devastation of war, this consideration may be relatively unimportant.

The total reparation that can be made by Germany will depend, in the main, upon the period over which reparation is to be made, the form of reparation, and the standard of living to be imposed on Germany. At the outset the victims of Germany may receive some assistance, owing to the removal from Germany of existing assets. German stockpiles of some goods can be made available to claimants. Productive facilities can also be moved from Germany to claimant countries.

Reparation in the form of production facilities is most desirable. It provides one of the speediest forms of reparation (provided transportation facilities in Germany are adequate). It is a very effective way of insuring disarmament. Plants in industries to be prohibited in Germany, and plant in excess of that to be permitted, can be made available to reparation claimants. Opposition to disarmament because of the destruction of valuable assets that may be involved is thereby minimized. The temptation to engage in prohibited activities in Germany is removed. Other countries are assisted to

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

build up industries for the products of which they have been dependent on Germany in the past and with dire consequences. But production facilities are badly damaged either by warfare or by overwork and undermaintenance. Reparation in this form may give the potential victims of Germany obsolete plants, thus creating vacuums in Germany that can later be filled with more modern equipment. Moreover, the period of the vacuum is one in which Germany is unlikely to become aggressive, because of its lack of manpower, if for no other reason. These problems, however, I have discussed in connection with disarmament.

The feasibility from an engineering point of view of recovering production facilities is considerably greater than might have been thought a few years ago. Russia and Germany have conducted very large-scale experiments during the war and with considerable success. Plants have also been moved in this country whose removal would not formerly have been thought possible.

German assets in foreign countries should also be seized, in order both to disarm Germany and to provide reparation. German penetration of foreign countries has been fully integrated with German policy in general. Foreign investments after the last war were used to continue abroad activities prohibited in Germany. Investments, patent arrangements, sales agreements, and the provision of technical aid to foreign concerns have all been used to acquire technical information for Germany, restrict industrial expansion in other countries, and provide the means for political propaganda abroad. Other countries have been weakened in their defense potential, both economically and politically.

THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS

But these assets will probably not be very great in amount. They have often been artfully concealed and will be difficult to uncover. They are in countries the governments of some of which may be unwilling to recognize Allied claims to them, either because they wish to make claims themselves or for political reasons. Thus they will be slowly and incompletely realized. Moreover, in their liquidation, prevention of their subsequent use to support German nationalism will be more important than the sums of money that can be realized. They are more important in terms of disarmament than in terms of reparation.

German labor can be supplied to work in foreign countries to repair war damage. This form of reparation can be fairly speedy. It presents, however, complicated problems to which I shall allude in a moment. The amount of reparation in this form will probably depend upon the willingness of countries to receive it rather than upon the ability of Germany to supply it. In general, countries that have suffered great physical devastation will be most ready to use German labor. Russia, for instance, has suffered terrible devastation and, as already said, is also so organized as to be able to use additional labor. The United States, on the other hand, has suffered no devastation and would be likely to oppose the introduction of German labor. In the East this problem will be especially difficult. The offer of Japanese labor to China would probably not be accepted. The East does not lack labor, and the political repercussions of the introduction of Japanese workers might be serious.

Property seized within Germany, such as the property of the Nazi party and of war criminals, will usually add

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

to reparation only if the property itself can be shipped abroad. But if it must be sold in Germany, it merely provides a means within Germany of financing reparation.

The principal remaining source of reparation is in the form of future output from Germany. This item is the most flexible one on the list. As time goes on, reparation in this form can be increased with the restoration of the economic system. Excluding political considerations, this item has no limit. Its size depends upon the period of time for which reparation continues. But it is not very helpful to exclude political considerations. If our ultimate objective is a world in which nations can live in peace together, somehow or other Germany must ultimately be introduced into that world system. But it must be remembered that, if the reparation period is short, little reparation can be obtained in this form.

The amount will also be affected by disarmament. It would be absurd to agree to disarmament in principle and yet require from Germany the kinds of goods that can be produced only from productive facilities of kinds that it has been decided Germany cannot be trusted to possess. After the last war the railroad rolling stock demanded as reparation by the victorious powers built up a branch of heavy industry in Germany while virtually collapsing it in the receiving countries. Reparation in coal, phosphates, and other minerals calls for little equipment in Germany and, unless it is supplied, the minerals cannot be obtained. But even these exports will call for the rehabilitation of the transportation system. Reparation in chemicals derived from coal tar require the maintenance of a chemical industry which

THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS

may provide the basis for future aggression. In the last resort if, as I have suggested, our primary objective is the prevention of a new aggression by Germany, reparation must be in a form consistent with the disarmament program. Reparation takes second place to disarmament.

Reparation in labor has much to commend it, although it will undoubtedly give rise to much difficulty. Considerable unemployment was inevitable in Germany in the period immediately after surrender owing to internal disorganization and devastation. In victim countries there is likely to be much work to be done which is directly related to German warlike activities. If German labor is not used, it will be lost and, indeed, may become a cause of unrest in Germany, seriously embarrassing the occupying forces. The use of German labor to clear up the debris of war will interfere little with the normal economies of the victim countries. As the work is finished, the workers can be withdrawn. German labor may also be usable in the re-erection in victim countries of production facilities removed from Germany.

The principal difficulty concerning reparation labor springs from the fear that the Allies may thereby take over one of the more repulsive practices of the Nazi government, namely, the use of slave labor. But even after 1918, although labor service was offered by Germany, little advantage was taken of it. Labor organizations in receiving countries feared that it would result in the unemployment of native labor. They also feared that the terms on which the labor was supplied would undermine the rates of pay and conditions of work of

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

native labor. There was probably also some fear of the political consequences of the infiltration of the population with German labor. All these considerations must be faced now.

Fear of unemployment will probably be one of the reasons underlying American unwillingness to accept German labor, and the same fear may be present in Great Britain. In other countries the amount of clearance to be done and the fact that it is work temporary in character and noncompetitive with normal occupations may reduce fear of the competition of reparation labor. To some extent, also, these considerations will reduce the fear that German reparation labor will undermine native standards of employment. But this latter fear can be allayed only by careful provisions regarding the conditions of work.

Part of the reparation labor can be supplied by war criminals. Persons or whole Nazi organizations, convicted of criminal acts and sentenced to definite periods of penal service, could provide a considerable volume of reparation labor if war criminals are prosecuted with vigor. These persons could work out their sentences in victim countries under penal conditions. Few people would object if properly convicted criminals were required to clear land of mines and remove the debris of war.

If the supply of labor from this source is inadequate, more difficult problems will arise. The arbitrary impressment of individuals in Germany or any class (such as war prisoners) having no greater guilt regarding German policies than any others, would undoubtedly foster a sense of injustice in Germany and of guilt in the

THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS

United Nations. The best solution would appear to be to build upon our own experience with organizations like the Construction Battalions (Seabees). Voluntary recruitment should be the aim, and it could be promoted by offering special inducements. These inducements would be compatible with the general policy of the Allies. It would be rational to offer special benefits to Germans willing personally to help to repair the damage of war. But special supervision of the conditions of life and work in foreign countries would be necessary. The nature of the relations between such workers and the population in the receiving country will pose difficult questions which cannot be answered now. The extent of reparation provided by this labor will, of course, be the net value of the work after allowing for any expenses incurred by the receiving country, for example, on food and housing, which it would usually be uneconomical to supply from Germany.

The core of the reparation problem, however, is the standard of living to be permitted to the enemy people as the base from which to calculate reparation. It would clearly be unreasonable, especially during the early stages, to say that this standard must be high enough to prevent unrest. To do so would be to encourage resistance movements. There is much suffering yet to come in Europe as a consequence of the war. Germany must take a large share of this suffering in the form of a meager standard of living. To do otherwise would be to fail in our ultimate objective of re-education. In fact, the German people have shown that they will accept a very low standard of living. They have also shown that they are less able to accept insecurity. It is important, there-

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

fore, that we do what we can to insure whatever low standard is agreed upon.

Past consumption in Germany, particularly during the war, might be used as a base from which to set the standard. These figures, however, have doubtless omitted considerable expenditure of capital (in the form of stocks of clothes, housing, and the like). But, on the other hand, they have been high in relation to most other European countries, including Great Britain.

This problem can be solved partly in economic terms. The Germans must get enough consumption goods to enable them to keep alive and produce the reparation goods needed. But it must also be solved partly in political terms. It will be difficult to allow them a standard of living as high as that of their victims. But some of their victims, particularly the Balkan countries, have always lived on a very much lower standard. In any event, a standard higher than that in neighboring Western victim countries will certainly not be politically acceptable. Finally, there will be in Germany means of production the use of which would benefit the Germans, although the produce could not be exported or would not greatly increase the well-being of other countries. To deny the use of these resources would demonstrate a wilful waste that would undermine the major policies of the Allies.

We must now turn briefly to the third major policy regarding Germany, that of "denazification." For what it may be worth, I say that those who have committed crimes against human decency and dignity must be punished. First, they are sources of future infection that must be removed from society for longer or shorter periods. Second, the strength of our conviction when we

THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY POWERS

verbally condemn such crimes will be measured in Germany by the amount of determination we show and the amount of unpleasant labor we are prepared to undertake to identify and punish these people. But it is supremely important that in each case the German people, as well as the peoples of the United Nations, have an opportunity for being reasonably sure that substantial justice has been done. The volume of cases will, however, be so large that some of the legal protections of normal times will have to be modified.

I confess to a gnawing fear that we may shrink from this work because it is so dirty. Those among us who live by the highest standards of Christian virtue may discourage prosecution because it is a job that easily veers off into vindictiveness and, in any event, focuses our minds on the lowest degradations of which our fellow-men are capable. Personally, I feel that the Christian virtues are worth maintaining even at the expense of much unpleasant work. I have no doubt that they have been at stake in the present war and that they have temporarily been saved by a terrifyingly narrow margin.

I should like to conclude on a reflective and somewhat ironical note. I said at the outset that we are faced with one of the greatest tasks of social engineering ever undertaken. It is that of reshaping two large and vigorous nations to fit into a pattern of world peace. Somewhat unconsciously, I think, in designing a nation capable of peaceful co-operation we are also setting a pattern of which in due time other nations may become envious. The prototype that is emerging is that of a nation released from the necessity of devoting a large part of its effort to preparation for, or prosecution of, war. It is a

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

nation deterred from the establishment of uneconomical industries and economic activities in order to be economically independent of its fellow-nations. It is one in which there is sufficient economic security to remove the fear of want and the extremities of behavior to which such fear leads. In the longer run it will probably be a relatively high and expanding consumption economy. When people acquire and learn to enjoy butter, they lose interest in guns.

But there is one thought which troubles me. These plans are aimed at undermining interest in a dangerous ascetic idealism by inculcating in other countries the kind of materialism that is dominant in our own culture. The ascetic idealism common to Germany and Japan has undoubtedly proved a curse to mankind, including those countries, but is the type of materialism by which we live the best way out? In the short run I see no alternative and little danger. But it is a disturbing question regarding the longer future.

GREAT POWERS AND SMALL STATES

By MALBONE W. GRAHAM

IN CLOSING the San Francisco Conference, President Truman touched the heart of our problem when he said:

"We all have to recognize—no matter how great our strength—that we must deny ourselves the license to do always as we please. No one nation, no regional group, can or should expect, any special privilege which harms any other nation. If any nation would keep security for itself, it must be ready and willing to share security with all. That is the price which each nation will have to pay for world peace. . . . Out of this conflict have come powerful military nations, now fully trained and equipped for war. But they have no right to dominate the world. It is rather the duty of these powerful nations to assume the responsibility for leadership toward a world of peace. That is why we have here resolved that power and strength shall be used not to wage war, but to keep the world at peace, and free from the fear of war."

In this straightforward, salty, simple language, our Chief Executive has stated succinctly the fundamental working hypothesis upon which, from this time forward, the relations between great powers and small states are going to be based. I, for one, am willing so to accept it, not only as a direct statement of fact and purpose, but

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

as the plain postulate of our collective policy—an articulate major premise of power relationships and the basic juridical definition of the primordial ethic which is henceforth to suffuse international life.

Such has not, unhappily, always been the case. Understanding how we have come by this new code for our aggregate societal behavior entails a brief inquiry as to the historical stages or, to use the terminology of a senescent generation, the different dispensations through which we have passed in order to attain it.

I. THE HERITAGE FROM HISTORY

Let me begin the treatment, then, not with a mere bow, but with a genuine tribute, to history! The story of the relations between the great powers and the small states did not begin yesterday. Indeed, all our reasoning about them stems from the fact that scarcely three hundred years ago, at the outset of our somewhat secularized age, the family of nations, in 1645, comprised in its European sense a half-dozen powerful states—England, France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Austria; a half-dozen middle-sized states—Prussia, Muscovy, the Ukraine, Poland-Lithuania, among them—and about two thousand¹ midget states so small as to be indistinguishable as states—politically independent entities—from the feudal estates of their baronial, ducal, arch-ducal, grand-ducal, or princely owners. And I think we will discover, if we delve deep enough, that only by

¹ "The Society," wrote T. J. Lawrence, "included about 2000 separate sovereignties, most of them insignificant in size and importance" adding: "the New Society of Nations, though, as regards the number of its members large, and indeed too large for real association, was, as regards the territory within its limits, small in comparison with the world outside" (*The Society of Nations* [1919], p. 32).

GREAT POWERS AND SMALL STATES

throwing over all of them the sable mantle of an immanent sovereignty could common qualities be imputed to them. Of these, equality in legal status, i.e., before the law, was the most outstanding. This bewildering diversity was somewhat simplified by the fact of an overwhelmingly dynastic character, for republics of any kind were decidedly in the minority and had few, if any, legal guaranties of their status. They embraced a number of ecclesiastic entities, which, since olden days, have been patterned after the order of Melchizedek, who was both priest and king. Such were the prince-bishoprics combining lay and secular status, with special benefices coming down from the days of pontifical ascendancy in an otherwise acephalous, chaotic world. Then, too, there were the city-republics, literally bourgeois, in which their high mightinesses, the burghers, had achieved special status along with special privilege. Of proletarian states in this era, notwithstanding certain leveling tendencies among the Puritans which were to make themselves manifest in Cromwell's day, there were none. Their time was not yet come.

II. EFFECTS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

On this initial structure of the European household the succeeding century and a half effected enormous change. Particularly in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic era its basic foundations were shaken, and much of the superstructure and the supporting social pyramid gave way. The proclamation, in the dynamic phases of the French Revolution, of territorially large republics² engulfed in oblivion many a feudal midget

² Such as the Batavian, Helvetic, Ligurian, Cisalpine, Parthenopean, Illyrian, etc.

state, along with virtually every ecclesiastical unit save the Papal States. It destroyed many of the bourgeois city-republics, and, when these large republics in turn disappeared in the course of the Napoleonic era, it was impossible, internationally speaking, wholly to restore the *ancien régime* that had come down, with varying vicissitudes, from the days of the Peace of Westphalia to those of the French Revolution. The disappearance of the midget state was the order of the day,³ the amalgamation of the kindred peoples, even if by conquest, particularly among the many Germanies, had taken place; it was well-nigh impossible to bring back, even with pontifical blessings, those church-state anomalies that perceptibly atrophied and perished in a decade of acute antireligion. Even the charmed circle of the great powers was altered, Russia and Prussia taking their place in its councils, while Sweden and Portugal sharply receded alike in status and in influence. Small wonder, then, that the great restoration on which the Congress of Vienna set its seal differed vastly from the old Europe and, to a larger extent than many of us have been willing to concede, admitted as *faits accomplis* the territorial, and consequently most of the dynastic, changes effected by the French Revolution.⁴

³ "The startling result is that instead of the two thousand or so international units existing in Europe when Grotius wrote, we now [1918] have only twenty-two. The Society of Nations has thus been simplified from within to an absolutely enormous extent. At the same time it has been amplified from without in an equally amazing manner" (Lawrence, *op. cit.*, p. 34).

⁴ Notwithstanding all the losses of status by absorption, annexation, or conquest, there were at Vienna no less than 216 heads of diplomatic missions other than those of the great powers. Cf. French Memorandum to the United States, November 21, 1918: "Tous les petits États étaient représentés et il y eut à Vienne jusqu'à 216 chefs de mission, mais la difficulté résultant du grand nombre des pays fut éludée parce qu'on décida de ne convoquer les

GREAT POWERS AND SMALL STATES

III. THE COMPROMISE OF VIENNA

This re-formation of Europe and so of the community of states, which, save for the existence outside it of a weak and stripling newcomer, the United States, was confined to Europe, was accomplished by a great and fundamental compromise. Alongside of the concrete, tangible treaty law of Europe, written on parchment and officiously tended by the custodians of the settlement, there grew up what a daring British scholar, with great perspicacity, called the "unwritten working Constitution of Europe," of which the informal meetings of the Concert of Europe were the most tangible evidence. But what has escaped general attention and was first noted accurately, if only marginally, by the late Robert B. Mowat, almost with the casualness of a historical aside,⁵ was a constitutional compromise of an extraordinarily pervasive character, which appears to have been followed so consistently over practically a century that

représentants des petits états qu'aux séances consacrées uniquement à leurs affaires spéciales" (D. H. Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, Vol. II, Doc. 4).

⁵ "Since the fall of the Roman Empire Europe has always consisted of a large number of states, big and little. In 1815 these became differentiated into Great Powers, irresistible, the guardians of the 'European System'; and Small Powers that assumed no responsibility. What people did not realize in the nineteenth century was that the Small Powers existed only on the sufferance of the Great. This fact was concealed by the Rule of Law (International Law, Law of Nations) which was observed and taken for granted. International Law died in the First World War and subsequent ten years; but only gradually was it realised that there was now no defense for Small Powers which could not defend themselves. Neutrality was the passion of the Minor Powers. As they construed it, neutrality meant 'no commitments,' no military alliances; and no military alliance, it has been found, meant helplessness: the Minor Powers fell, one by one" (R. B. Mowat, *Europe since Versailles* [Privately printed, 1944], p. 85).

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

any purely capricious and coincidental character to it can conclusively be ruled out. It was a virtually unrecorded understanding, an inarticulate major premise of a politico-military character, on the basis of which the small and lesser powers conceded to the great, not a paramountcy of interest or a formal disparity of status, but an almost exclusive political responsibility for action. This permitted the lesser states, in consequence, to evade every form of political or military accountability for the maintenance of the societal peace. This Compromise of Vienna between the great powers and the other European states allowed a very real degree of disarmament on the part of the lesser states, to the lowest level consistent with domestic safety and the repression of intramural revolution. The Vienna system, of course, permitted the maintenance of small armies for display purposes—to parade on state occasions; to impress or dragoon reluctant parliaments; to facilitate the return to power of minority governments; to keep labor in hand; or to support the tottering pillars of religious orthodoxy. But the one thing which was not permitted under any circumstances was the development of sufficient power on the part of any one state or of a political coalition to put in peril the existing territorial status quo.

Granted that the map of Europe as drawn at the Congress of Vienna placed military factors foremost in the actual distribution of power and that considerations of mutual security were paramount to the claims of nationality, the system established by the Vienna compromise was not without its immediate military benefits. The logical consequence of the division of responsi-

GREAT POWERS AND SMALL STATES

bility in such manner that the smaller states did not look beyond their own horizons and the great powers took all the risks was the coming-into-being, on a scale unknown to the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, of a system of *territorial*⁶ neutrality in which all the small states, and occasionally one or two of the great powers, participated. And to make sure that specific areas of high military value should undeviatingly remain apart from land conflict, the great powers underwrote their neutrality by a curious combination of positive territorial guaranties, such as loom large in all types of collective security, and the imposition of drastic servitudes with regard to the exercise of the warmaking power. The whole rise and fall of the neutralization movement, which I have discussed elsewhere⁷ is richly illustrative of the thesis I have just laid down. In fact, because it pushes to the extreme for specific "special-risk" states the postulates of the inarticulate, but prevailing, general policy—the internal content of abstentive neutrality but not the correlative responsibility of territorial guaranty—the whole theory of neutralization can be seen as an extension, if not a *reductio ad absurdum*, of the tacitly applied larger policy, undoubtedly anchored in equili-

⁶ A careful scrutiny of the development of neutral practice will reveal the enormous hiatus between the development of the rules and practice of maritime neutrality and the similar evolution of the rules of neutrality in the event of war on land. The former go back to the time of the Consolato del Mare; the latter, with rare exceptions that only go to prove the rule, such as, for example, the neutrality of the Prince-Bishopric of Liège, are decidedly more modern, although the role of the Ardennes Gap in the erection of the *système de la barrière* antedates both Richelieu and Vauban. Any consideration of the neutral practices of the Swiss cantons before the Act of Mediation of 1803 would have scandalized the neutrality legislators of 1935-41!

⁷ M. W. Graham, "Neutralization as a Movement in International Law," *American Journal of International Law*, XX, No. 1 (January, 1927), 79-94.

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

brative diplomacy and divorced from all ethical regard for human freedom. It can, I think, be categorically stated, in consequence, that so long as the system of neutrality, explicit or tacit, persisted, no system of collective security could come into being. Conversely, I believe we are justified in assuming in the light of this historical evidence that under any effective system of collective security there can be no neutrality.

In short, the differentiation of the political units comprising the European household down to the late nineteenthies was inferable from, and consequent upon, the system of neutrality. It operated to vest in the group wishing or willing to assume the risks the funded executive power of the European commonwealth, so that the principal or great powers, without going so far as to assume a corporate character, acted from time to time, continuingly if not continuously, in a broadly representative capacity which was not challenged, even if it was not wholly liked, by the lesser states. What I here wish to emphasize is that the European directory of the great powers came into being more by default than by the eagerness of the smaller states to accept a limited-liability status in policy-making, one commensurate with the share of responsibilities they were willing to assume, than because they were compelled in any general way to acknowledge juridical limitations on their national style.

IV. AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

Let us now examine somewhat more critically the position of the great powers and the small states at the close of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the

GREAT POWERS AND SMALL STATES

twentieth. Time and ideas had long been operative in eroding the position of unrivaled power and prestige initially held by the signers of the Quintuple Alliance. Watered down in the first decade after Waterloo, their position in the European Concert tended to decline in the course of the nineteenth century in virtue of the expansion of the international community from purely European to global scope, owing as much to the addition of new members from the Old World⁸ as from the New.⁹ Thus the inchoate world community, expanding from one continent to four continents, underwent fundamental quantitative change. But it also underwent the impact of ideas—ideas born of the French Revolution and given further impetus by mass reactions of many groups in many lands. Foremost among these were rights of self-determination, applied chiefly to oppressed Christian minorities living under Ottoman rule and to the colonial populaces of the Portuguese and Spanish empires. But the idea of equality was no less vital and was avidly espoused by all the newcomers into the international vineyard. In the end, the vast expansion of membership, the entry on the world scene of two new great powers—the United States of America and imperial

⁸ Thus, considering, for example, only the historical interval between the Vienna treaties and the end of the Crimean War (1815-56), the community of states gained a great power—Turkey—and a number of lesser powers: in the West, Belgium; in the Levant, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, the Danubian principalities, and Persia; and China, Japan, and Siam in the Orient, while from the New World it gained (1) the Argentine Confederation, (2) Brazil, (3) Chile, (4) the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation, (5) Nueva Granada, (6) the Republic of Central America, and (7) Mexico. The subsequent development of fissiparous tendencies among the New World countries markedly accelerated the process of decentralization.

⁹ See above, n. 3.

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Japan—the development of far-reaching differences followed by rival group organization of the great powers *inter se*, such as the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente—all these developments set the seal of doom on the Vienna system in a number of ways and called for politically remedial efforts of a fundamental character if the whole structure was not to be cataclysmically shattered.

In the effort to avert the catastrophe, two separate, but successive, efforts were made which fundamentally touched at various points the key problem of the relations of the greater and lesser states. In convoking the First and Second Hague Conferences, the Czar of Russia not only endeavored personally to extricate his country from a position of great peril, but entertained two major hopes, neither of which was destined to real fruition—first, that of effecting a reduction of armament and, second, that of elaborating formal procedures for peaceful settlement. It is clear now, in the retrospect of nearly half a century, that any real grapple with disarmament must surely encounter the question of relative strength, position, armor, and prestige, whereas subscription to pacific procedures necessarily entailed, as the German delegate, Marschall von Bieberstein, was among the first to point out, the surrender of strategic advantage and time-conditioned operations. On the other hand, particularly at the Second Hague Conference, the presence of forty-four states, more than half of which had come into existence after the Congress of Vienna, posed in an acute form the future general juridical organization of the international community. But actually no reorganization was yet possible.

GREAT POWERS AND SMALL STATES

V. THE DECADES OF THE HAGUE, 1899-1919

It is well that we keep clearly in mind the nature of the system to which the First and Second Hague Conferences gave their sanction. For close onto two-score years, they have been considerably overrated, particularly in the United States. It is only as we consider them in retrospect for what they really were that we can gain insight into their influence on the relationships of power in the world community which they were too weak to attempt, and, in fact, did not attempt, to organize. So overwhelmingly dominated were they by military men and by lawyers that their work suffers from a very real militaristic and juristic myopia. Largely confining their efforts to the provision of a system of pacific settlement of a wholly optional character, they not only left untouched the system of neutrality, then ramifying through equilibrative diplomacy into every corner of the world, but instead steadfastly sought to consecrate and perpetuate it by putting its anarchic law on a pedestal and seeking, through an International Prize Court, to legalize and sanctify that anarchy on an international scale.¹⁰

In short, for all their pretentious lawmaking, the Hague Conferences were posited on the continuance of the balance-of-power relationships which the Spanish American War, the Boer War, and the Russo-Japanese War successively showed to be in a serious, if not a critical, condition. Small wonder that their efforts at the in-

¹⁰ It should be noted that at The Hague the United States of America, with a peculiar political time-lag, played the role in which it was still psychologically cast—that of a small, nineteenth-century neutral—although it had, in fact, become a world figure, with unquestioned great-power status on the diplomatic scene.

stitutionalization of the life of the international community were exiguous, hesitant, and did not actively touch the channeling of power.¹¹ But much too much has been made of their feeble work—so much so before 1914 that the whole civilized world stood in genuine, if rather uncritical, awe of the work accomplished at The Hague. The concrete reality of an ornate building, the Peace Palace, gave a deceptive appearance to a system which did not seek to mutualize or share the responsibility for the maintenance of peace. It was, instead, a system which gave a field day to small powers giddy with the intoxicating wine of formalistic equality. Headed by Senhor Ruy Barbosa of Brazil, the small states, newly invited to the conclaves of the great¹², virtually stymied the formation of a real Court of Arbitral Justice and, because they could not agree on any measure of their power, endeavored to block even the International Prize Court, whose work admittedly concerned chiefly the maritime powers. Such self-assertiveness on the part of small states was hardly conducive to international security and order. It is little wonder that they were aggregately characterized as “obstructionist,” “obsessed with the fetish of unanimity,” and described as constituting “an international ochlocracy.” On the other hand, the system also left virtually untied the hands of the great powers. It was shot through with that anarchic liberalism of which the notorious *liberum veto*

¹¹ Even so sympathetic an interpreter as Walther Schücking, in his renowned *The International Union of the Hague Conferences* (1918), has to concede this.

¹² Schücking trenchantly observes that down to 1907 the role of the smaller states was almost altogether social and that only after that date could they be regarded as genuine participants in the life of the international community (*ibid.*, p. 227).

GREAT POWERS AND SMALL STATES

generally associated only with Poland was, in reality, the essence.

I have ventured to dwell at some length on the weaknesses of the Hague system because of the tremendous influence it had during World War I on the efforts to reorganize the international community. Once the lights went out over Europe, tapers began to be lit at the altar of *l'œuvre de La Haye*, and it required an appalling amount of concerted agitation and political activity to dispel the myth or overcome the inertia of those who were wedded to the ideas that dominated the Hague Conferences. Everywhere the cry was "Back to The Hague," back to an invertebrate skeletal organization which paradoxically won praise in inverse proportion to its power to coerce. Only as the war continued and its repercussions were felt abroad was the reorganization of the world community on different, even antithetical, principles vitally affecting the relationships between the large and small nations, seriously envisaged. While the work of the professional peacemakers proceeded in very nearly an ideological vacuum in Continental neutral capitals,¹³ the conception of a league to enforce peace

¹³ The principal group propagating these views was the Central Organization for a Durable Peace, formed at The Hague by Jongheer Dr. B. de Jong Van Beek en Donk shortly after the outbreak of World War I. Early in 1915 it enunciated a nine-point program whose fourth article looked to the development of "the work of the Hague Conferences with a view to the peaceful organization of the Society of Nations" and declared that "the Hague Conference shall be given a permanent organization and meet at regular intervals." The same point of view was put forward as late as 1918 by the French Association de la Paix par le Droit, when it declared: "Especially does the Association remain convinced that the work done by the Hague Conferences still contains the promise of fruit and needs only to be completed." For the views of Christian L. Lange in "The Hague Conference and its Permanent Organization," of Walther Schücking on the "Extension of the Work of the

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

was born in America and quickly brought to a high degree of maturity. Here was an idea, a concept, almost the work of amateurs, that, to attain peace, realistically pooled political power for military purposes and, conversely, sought to preserve achieved peace by the pooling of military power for political purposes. Its appeal was instant and profound. Nevertheless, the proponents were so serious in their advocacy of power that they were willing to be extremely exclusive at the outset.¹⁴ With the giving of the support of President Wilson to the scheme, the inclusiveness of the league idea grew, and with adroit manipulation, the ideas of the British League of Nations Society and those of the advocates of a league to enforce peace achieved a substantial synthesis,¹⁵ enough at least to obviate conflict and to utilize their combined experience to define anew the working relationships of power.¹⁶

Hague," and the proposals of William I. Hull regarding "The Development of the Hague Conference and Its Work" see G. Lowes Dickinson (ed.), *Problems of the International Settlement* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1918), pp. vi, 28-34, 35-50, 170-81, 200-205.

¹⁴ For the mélange of initial ideas cf. Theodore Marburg, *Development of the League of Nations Idea* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1932), *passim*; and Ruhl J. Bartlett, *The League To Enforce Peace* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944); Charles F. Carter (ed.), *Enforced Peace: Proceedings of the First Annual Assemblage of the League To Enforce Peace, Washington, May 26-27, 1916* (Garden City: Country Life Press, 1916).

¹⁵ As late as the middle of 1918, Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson noted that in England, as on the Continent, "the question that is raised most prominently . . . is whether the proposed League should build on the foundation of the Hague Conferences" and expressed his fears lest there should develop "an important cleavage between Anglo-Saxon and Continental advocates of the League" (*op. cit.*, pp. xiv-xv).

¹⁶ Cf. James (Viscount) Bryce and Others, *Proposals for the Prevention of Future Wars* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1917).

GREAT POWERS AND SMALL STATES

VI. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POWER, 1919-39

So far we have been dealing chiefly in ideas. Let us now turn for a moment to practice. If we survey the hinterlands of the League of Nations Covenant, we will find it influenced quite as much by certain wartime experiences as by the theoretical proposals of the ideologues, no matter how high their rank or office. I attribute to the Imperial War Conferences of the British government, to the Imperial War Cabinet, to the Supreme War Council, and, in due course, to the Supreme Council an enormous and important role alike in channeling power and in stabilizing power relationships at the close of World War I. With the disappearance of two great powers—Austria-Hungary and Turkey—and the temporary eclipse of two others—Germany and Russia—power necessarily tended to drift into the hands of the group juridically recognized as “The Principal Allied and Associated Powers”—the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan. It was they who engineered the Peace Conference, arranged the scheme of representation,¹⁷ divided and subdivided into the “Big 10,” the “Big 4,” and collateral substructures of an economic and financial character, all of which could not fail to leave their impact on the League Council, the Assembly, the Labour Organization, etc.

My main thesis here is that *the major task in international reconstruction, in the period between wars, was the institutionalization of power—i.e., the creating of appropriate entities and the development of effective procedures*

¹⁷ Cf. U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, I, 223-81; III, 172-75.

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

by which the reorganized community, or league, or society of nations could attain its principal objectives. In the initial stage of institution-building, which succeeded fairly well in Europe but hardly attained comparable results in the Pacific area,¹⁸ the reconstruction of international life and the relations between large and small states were influenced primordially by the multiplication of modern state units in Europe itself, in consequence of the breakdown of imperial structures—a process which brought into being Albania, Czechoslovakia, Eire, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, an enlarged Greece and an inflated Romania, a truncated Hungary, a residual Austria, and a hastily fused Yugoslavia. This was accompanied by a mighty upsurge of Levantine nationalism, presaging the general awakening of the Middle East and accounting for a new lease of life on the part of Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey; the achievement of precarious independence on the part of Egypt, the Hedjaz, and the Nejd (today incorporated into Saudi Arabia), Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria; not to mention abortive—or unsuccessful—separatist movements among the Moslem populaces of the Russian Empire and even of British India. All these conspired greatly to expand the membership of the international community at the moment when it was receiving a corporeal,

¹⁸ It is difficult to convey how dominantly opposed the United States government was to the establishment of anything faintly savoring of international control in connection with the Pacific area. Thus the Washington Conference came and went without begetting any extension of structure more potent or enduring than a commission of a purely recommendatory character to examine how and on what terms extra-territoriality might be liquidated. Throughout this period the United States, methodically, schematically, endeavored to dismantle and scuttle not only the machinery of defense—over-age naval vessels—but also the machinery of co-operation.

GREAT POWERS AND SMALL STATES

albeit inchoate, form. At the same time there developed a cluster of proletarian republics—Ukraine, Byelo-Russia, Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia, Karelia, Azerbaijan—all of which still survive, with at least “constitutional” international personality, not counting a number of paper structures which did not become flesh and dwell among us.

At the same time the American republics took a further step forward in asserting their international personality and, while still paying lip-service to principle, began to develop gradations of power *inter se*, in striking contrast to their intransigent equalitarianism in the days of the Second Hague Conference. In 1919 and for a few years thereafter the international community was obviously in gestation. That it grew no larger was primarily due to the fact that eventually the centripetal forces in the land that had known only the czars eventually asserted themselves and prevented, indeed reversed, a patent process of disintegration, the end of which it was otherwise difficult to foresee. All told, monarchical states sharply declined in number, the semitheocracies—the sultanate-caliphate, the lamanates of Mongolia and Central Asia, the sherifate of Mecca and Medina, even the territorial claims of the Holy See—all but vanished; it was the heyday of bourgeois republicanism, and the first proletarian republics put in their appearance, negotiating now separately, now conjointly, at successive international gatherings. In this setting of social upheaval and economic reordering, the first efforts to give the international community institutional form were undertaken.

From 1919 to 1924 there was evident a strange dual-

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

ism, the trepidating coexistence of two systems—the old with its ceremonial pomposity and great-power paramountcy and side by side with it the new, egalitarian and legalitarian, developing its techniques of cooperation as it proceeded and constantly reaching into new fields. In a curious, hesitant way each reacted to the other, passing from out-and-out irreconcilability to compromise, accommodation, and reconciliation. At the outset there was the Supreme Council, a body so exclusive, so strong, that it represented in many respects the pooled authority, military and political, of the coalition of the Allied and Associated Powers. Yet by its very nature, comprising the meeting of heads of governments, it could be only intermittent in its meeting, episodic, irregular, and fortuitous; it lacked the essential element of continuity which was indispensable to the systematic winding-up of the Peace Conference; after 1920 it was, to the best of my knowledge, convoked but once, by Briand on his assumption of office in 1921, and was thereafter allowed to fall into deliberate desuetude. Most of its tasks passed, after the close of the Paris Peace Conference, into the hands of the Conference of Ambassadors,¹⁹ which, in the words of Paul Mantoux, became for a certain period “the executive—*de facto* if not *de jure*—of a European directorate of Great Powers” and, I may add, a body deliberately designed to withdraw subject matter from the competence of the institutions of the League of Nations.

In a formal sense this period of obfuscation ended

¹⁹ Cf. Gerhard P. Pink, *The Conference of Ambassadors (Paris, 1920-1931)* (“Geneva Studies,” Vol. XII, Nos. 4-5 [February, 1942]) (Geneva: Geneva Research Center, 1942).

GREAT POWERS AND SMALL STATES

early in 1924 with the agreement of Premiers MacDonald and Herriot to handle major diplomatic matters through the League of Nations; but neither prime minister was able to bind his successors in office—witness the technique of concluding the Locarno Agreements in 1925! In a general way it may be said that backsliding from the sawdust-trail promise to transact business at Geneva began almost immediately after MacDonald—“un prédicateur écossais,” Geneva called him—left office in 1924; but it is nevertheless true that by that time the authority of the Conference of Ambassadors, in turn, began to fall into disrepute. For a brilliant seven-year period, ending in 1933, the relations between the great powers and the smaller states reached the height of their institutionalization, and Geneva set the fashion for the chancelleries of all countries. On the whole, the world enjoyed, during this period, a greater measure of formal equality than ever before; it witnessed the vast democratization of procedures, the leveling of social and ceremonial differences between states, and the channeling of much—very nearly all²⁰—of the power through accepted institutions. Let us not berate or undervalue it: it was very real and very genuine.

But with the coming into power of the Nazi regime, the studied equalitarianism which had been practiced

²⁰ It should be remembered that both the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were represented at the Disarmament Conference from 1932 on and that their diplomacy was markedly influenced by the procedures of Geneva. Of course, the United States had an opportunity to work out its own problem in the Pan-American Conferences of 1923 and 1928, which were no less democratic, even if formalistic, than the gatherings at Geneva; but the issues raised in Pan-American gatherings were not basically related to security and rather partook of the nature of the old Hague system—witness the discussions of maritime neutrality at Havana in 1928!

at Geneva came in for rude blows, one of the first of which was the signing of the Four Power Pact of Rome on July 15, 1933. It sought, assertedly within the framework of the League of Nations Covenant, to pledge Britain, France, Italy, and Germany to work as an inner directory of the European community for a period of ten years.²¹ Actually, the pact was stillborn and never formally invoked, but it inaugurated a period of conversations *à quatre*, which, in fact, kept separating the four major European powers from the rest of their kind—Russia, Japan, and the United States—and also accomplished yeoman service in the destruction of the relations of the great with the lesser powers in Europe—witness the rapid deterioration of the French Alliance system! It marked the return to a balance-of-power system and inevitably wrote the doom of collective security. Whether consciously realizing it or not, the signatories of the Four Power Pact undertook at Rome the first steps that led to Munich and eventually to war. The initial break with the conception of the collective system thus antedated German withdrawal from Geneva and the Italian challenge two years later. By piecemeal repudiation, by the attempted organization of a *gerarchia* of the great powers, the institutional framework of the loose confederacy of Geneva was undone.

²¹ The Pact, in its early version, elicited a comment in the Department of State's press releases to the effect that this was "a scarcely veiled attempt to complete the undermining of League prestige, to eliminate the lesser powers from their increasing importance in the counsels of Europe, and to establish a sort of Directorate of four, in which France, deprived of her eastern alliances, and with Russia strictly excluded, would be in a minority of one, while Britain's chronic vacillation would make of Italy the finger on the balance of European power" (May 27, 1933).

GREAT POWERS AND SMALL STATES

VII. THE ROAD TO SAN FRANCISCO

Between the adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations by the Paris Peace Conference and the meeting of the San Francisco Conference lie almost exactly twenty-six years of historical time, but years which, measured in the advances of technology, might rival the achievements of almost as many centuries. In these intervening years the world passed from basically two-dimensional warfare into three-dimensional warfare, and the natural or topographical barriers that in all previous history had separated, and in a large sense defended, states ceased to exist. With the coming of an age of air power, the spatial relationships previously regarded as fixed went into the discard, and new conceptions of distance and vulnerability, or intercontinental relationships, came into being. Apart from the dramatic exploits of the first to fly these distances, they were initially associated wholly with war; and air power became the immediate concern and the ultimate handmaiden of the geostrategists. They were concerned primarily with the military use of the newly discovered airways, and it is not to be wondered at that the *Institut für Geopolitik* was at the forefront in research as to the uses of air power, always for aggression, for surprise.²² It was not until the war came to America, to the Australians, and to other peoples in its path, that the functional relationship of position to air power became evident.

In the ensuing months and years we have learned—

²² In this respect Haushofer and Goering were only traveling in the wake of Marschall von Bieberstein, whose reluctance to abandon the advantages of strategic surprise was the *bête noire* of the Hague Conferences.

the hard way—what space and position mean in global war. This, more than any other single factor, has given rise to the striking phenomenon of the emergence, within the fold of the United Nations, of a new class of states which, practically without exception, would have been regarded before the war as small or distinctly second- or third-rate powers. They now appear in a new role, variously described as the “middle states,” the “mediate states,” and the “security states,” the labels giving in themselves a sense of the conscious groping for more adequate nomenclature to describe a phenomenon as yet imperfectly understood and appreciated. The first designation is clearly a bid for rank on the basis of positional or situational advantage; the second, a little more air-minded, is already conscious of the role played by given states as liaison points, as connecting links, as *traits-d’union* between one state and another; the third hits the target directly in sensing the role which such states can play in the over-all problem of security. It was Dr. Herbert Vere Evatt of Australia who quaintly defined the “security states” as those which could not, of themselves, afford security to the international community but without which security could not be had. This is not a bit of antipodean circumlocution, but a very straightforward, realistic, functional statement of fact. And when this conception is applied to the members of the community of nations, it yields certain very interesting results. Certain countries, like Argentina and Chile, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, become, by their very geographical position, *terminal* countries, at the end of communications arteries, and, while useful from various standpoints in the wider in-

GREAT POWERS AND SMALL STATES

ternational economy, are chiefly in the *terminus ad quem* category. They are at the end of the line; they lead nowhere else, at least in our present stage of technology. But on occasion, as in the fight to recover mastery of Africa, they can serve as great and inaccessible strategic bases—witness the functional role of the Union of South Africa in that campaign. In a much larger sense Australia is also cast in this role and has shown it in the present war. Without her, security could not have been had in the South Pacific; with her it was a positively attainable achievement.

But if there is a *terminus ad quem*, there is also a *terminus a quo*: this is in the highest degree the label which may appropriately be given to the countries which serve as springboards for the shorter trans-oceanic flights, most noteworthy Canada and Brazil, together with certain colonial dependencies like Alaska and Greenland, which the age of air power has endowed with high strategic significance. In a sense they serve also as staging areas for even longer flights, as do the insular dependencies of other states, noteworthy the Netherlands East Indies. Even areas previously thought of as hopelessly backward and of no value in terms of mere terrestrial and maritime warfare suddenly assume new status—witness Nigeria, Ethiopia, the Congo and the Sudan and Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran and India and Burma. It is obvious that the country of ownership of any of these areas is projected far and high in strategic security significance. Out of this fact the “security states” have been born. It is now incontestible that the “security states” will come to occupy in increasing degree a role of importance in the United Nations Organi-

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

zation, for they are as indispensable to the working of a system of collective security as they would, under other circumstances, have been to the establishment of grandiose, totalitarian empire. *The emergence of the middle states, for perfectly objective security reasons, is one of the most striking political phenomena of our time.*

In the light of the real geopolitics of our age—the harnessing of all strategic considerations to a scheme for the maintenance of the societal peace—the problem of organization becomes not simpler but more complex. And if it is to be adequately solved, it must not do violence to the principle of equality in the general representation of interests; but it must also not commit the cardinal sin of omission by leaving out of the picture the middle states, as they were so palpably ignored in the days of the decline and demise of the League of Nations. That is why the structural blueprint of the United Nations Organization assumes the very highest significance. In the General Assembly all may have a voice on matters of general concern; in the Economic and Social Council the smaller and the middle powers can gain eminence; but it is in the newly created Security Council that the fundamental factors of security are joined. Here there will be represented not merely the great powers, reduced in numbers yet enhanced in influence, but the middle powers, the states whose co-operation is essential to the maintenance of international peace and security, probably to the point of exclusion, or virtual exclusion, of the states whose contribution to security will be minimal, or at best marginal. This is not an affront to reason but a capitulation to realities. It is the affirmation of proportional responsibility which gives a

GREAT POWERS AND SMALL STATES

sobering character and a responsible ethic to the new organization.

This leads me to my final point: *If the gigantic task at the time of the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations was in the main the creation of viable institutions, the institutionalization of power, the primordial task of the present has been and will continue to be the constitutionalization of power.* San Francisco has shown not merely the translation of a mechanical blueprint into an institutional pattern but something more. The structural entities, which preserve the best out of the League period and amplify new and important functions, do not come to us with an aura of celestial majesty devoid of juridical precision, as did Council, Secretariat, and Assembly a quarter-century ago; they come in tangible, clear-cut, precise form and with known interrelationships. In every subcommittee, committee, and commission, in the Steering Committee, the Executive Committee, and the Coordinating Committee of the San Francisco Conference, there has been one dominating thought—to establish not a vast spiritual hierarchy from pope to proletarian, not a cabal of monarchies or aristocracies, not a directorate of dictators, or the ochlocracy of the unruly many, but a new framework of legality, a working mechanism for the exercise of power; a permanent tie not merely between governments but corporately between peoples; and a system of societal responsibility from which there is no ethical escape, no refuge in an obsolete neutrality, no retreat in a renewed artificial balancing of power. The area of irresponsibility, euphemistically referred to under the older dispensation as “the gaps in the Covenant,” has been markedly

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

reduced; the relationships of stability and change have been brought into greater harmony, so that they may readjust within the framework of a known and approved legality; the avenue of progress upward toward self-government has been cleared and opened to peoples who knew it not; but primordially there has been the channeling of political energy, the constitutionalization of authority, the careful delimitation and demarcation of acknowledged power. The greatest human safeguards have been placed around its exercise, but power itself has deliberately not been shackled. That is, to my way of thinking, the greatest social achievement of our age.

Writing a decade ago at a time when a defeatist generation began to adulate the pre-war world of 1914, Bertrand Russell upbraided the credulous nostalgia it implied, in pointing out that the breakdown of 1914 marked an initial victory of technology over the im-
plasticity of political conceptions. To that tragic time lag between inventiveness and social institutions he ascribed the dark tragedy of World War I.

Today, as we look into the future, we have vastly greater reason to rejoice. While the instruments of death have, in these recent years, achieved new mastery, there have been even greater societal gains. The integration of the free world has begun to take visible, tangible, powerful form; power is enlisted in the constructive service of society. We may yet live to see the final triumph of the societal pattern over the atavistic forces of anarchy and chaos.

REGIONALISM AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

By FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

IN DEFERENCE to an old custom which I try always to honor more in the observance than in the breach, I take as my text for today's sermon a well-known passage from my favorite piece of British propaganda:

"There's glory for you!" "I don't know what you mean by 'glory,'" Alice said. Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't—till I tell you. I meant, 'there's a nice knock-down argument for you.'" "But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument,'" Alice objected. "When *I* use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less." "The question is," said Alice, "whether you *can* make words mean so many different things." "The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be Master—that's all."

If the more extravagant expectations of uncritical optimists regarding the San Francisco Charter were to be realized, glory would become masterful, and mastery would become glorious, and all would be for the best in the best of possible worlds. But we are still entangled in the meaning of words and more than a little bewildered by the meaning of meaning and by the elusive connection, if any, between nonverbal behavior and the words we employ to describe or disguise it.

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

THE POWERFUL AND THE POWERLESS

It is the purpose of this paper to take further thought regarding a particular aspect of the effort of the United Nations to organize global peace and security. That aspect has to do with the relations between the strong and the weak in the Western state system. Peace and security are threatened by relations among the strong only when the strong become rivals for power among themselves. Should this familiar design for conflict recur again in the future, as it has so often in the past, then the entire enterprise of peace will fail, and all the words and hopes of San Francisco will fade and wither in the fierce and consuming heat of preparations for World War III. Peace and security are never threatened by relations among the weak, except when the weak become pawns of rival powers or are permitted to recover strength to challenge the strong. In the unity of the strong lies the only available basis of peace. In the relations between the strong and the weak lie some of the major sources of disunity, rivalry, and war.

The questions suggested by the words "Regionalism and Spheres of Influence" are akin to the questions already discussed under "Treatment of Enemy Powers" and "Great Powers and Small States," in that all have to do with relations between the feeble and the mighty. The specific issues to which I would direct attention are those which have to do with dependent peoples and weak states lying within the colonial empires or strategic security zones of strong powers.

We are all agreed that we want justice and freedom for such peoples and states, whatever these words may

REGIONALISM AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

mean. We are also agreed that we want order and peace for all peoples and all states. It is often said that without justice there can be no peace. But this generalization, albeit true at times for communities of individuals, is false for the community of nations. Weak nations can never menace peace, however unjustly they may be dealt with, so long as they remain weak and so long as strong nations act together to keep them weak. War flows not from injustice but from anarchy—i.e., from the lack of a strong central power vested with a monopoly of violence and therefore able to forbid recourse to violence by others. It would be more true to say that without peace there can be no justice, for Right is ever the first victim of Might when rival powers clash in arms.

The dilemma here suggested is the age-old dilemma of political man: how to reconcile liberty and authority, freedom and discipline, justice and order. The problem has often been satisfactorily resolved over large areas and for long periods of time within national frontiers. Since the disintegration of the Roman world state, it has never been satisfactorily or enduringly resolved in that larger community of nations and peoples which has become, in Wendell Willkie's phrase, "One World." Whether the San Francisco solution will prove satisfactory or enduring remains to be seen. In any case, the problem of dependent peoples and regional security blocs cannot be discussed intelligibly save within the context of the larger dilemma of modern mankind. Therefore, I shall devote part of these observations to exploring the shape of the forest rather than the details of the trees.

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

THE DEED AND THE WORD

Our larger problem has become painfully complicated by a contradiction between the realities of power in the world society and the vocabulary we habitually employ in speaking of international relations. The realities are not a product of conscious purpose or planning. Like Topsy, they "just grewed." They have sprung from the more or less blind and fortuitous clashing of national states against one another. The standardized vocabulary of the United Nations, on the other hand, has been deliberately selected by politicians and publicists—not, I take it, with malice prepense for the confusion of the unwary but rather for the expression and fulfilment of aspirations which somehow are forever being tragically frustrated by the realities. The result is a kind of incipient schizophrenia, which is perhaps a manifestation of that "schism in the soul" attributed by Arnold J. Toynbee to all decadent civilizations. An economic analogue of the contradiction is to be found in the anxiety of many trust-makers and carteleers to preserve what is called "free enterprise" and in the conviction of many monopolists that all public planning is a new road to serfdom. But in no field is the discrepancy between facts and phrases greater than in the field of world politics in the aftermath of World War II.

The facts are so plain as to impress themselves vividly and disturbingly even upon those most addicted to the words. Since the collapse of the last Western world state, the allegedly human race has lived in anarchy and has often discovered, with Thomas Hobbes, that under anarchy life is "poor, solitary, nasty, brutish and short."

REGIONALISM AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

The anarchy from which we suffer springs from the diffusion of power among a multiplicity of sovereignties, all of which, of necessity under anarchy, act on the assumption of violence and each of which is the potential enemy of its neighbors and the potential ally of its neighbors' neighbors. Politics under anarchy is power politics, since no other kind of politics is possible without government. And since nothing deserving to be called world government is on the horizon, the problem of peace remains a problem of power politics.

In the evolution of international anarchy, particularly since the Industrial Revolution, the number of sovereignties has progressively declined through regional conquests and consolidations. Local communities, classified in terms of power, i.e., fighting capacity, have gotten themselves divided into great powers, secondary powers, and minor powers, along with protectorates, mandates, and colonies whose people have been too weak to maintain their sovereignty against the strong. The number of great powers has likewise diminished: eight in 1914, seven in 1924, five in 1944, four in the last months of hostilities, and only three since the capitulation of Japan. The double triangle of World War II (Berlin-Rome-Tokyo versus London-Moscow-Washington) is a single triangle in the second world peace of our time.

These developments are a result of the growing disparity of power between the strong and the weak. The European states facing the Atlantic took almost three hundred years to conquer the old colonial empires of the eighteenth century. After 1880, however, a mere thirty years sufficed for the complete subjugation and parti-

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

tion of Africa, Oceania, and much of Asia—a process in which the term “spheres of influence” first became current to describe areas nominally under the jurisdiction of native states but allocated by agreement among the empire-builders to the control of particular colonial powers. Two centuries ago, and even a single century ago, small and weak states could often resist great powers for months and even years. In our time Denmark and Luxembourg are conquered in a day; the Netherlands in five days; Poland, Norway, and Belgium in a fortnight; and France, once the most powerful of powers, in little more than a month. All the Davids of today, even if banded together, are helpless before the Goliaths.

These changing realities of *Realpolitik* mean that decisive power now rests exclusively with communities possessed of the personnel, plants, and productivity required for the conduct of industrialized total war. With the fall of Germany and Japan, only the United States, the Soviet Union, and the British Commonwealth of Nations will control these components of effective influence. Almost half of the world's industrial capacity is in the United States. Of the balance, almost half is in the U.S.S.R., and much of the remainder is in the British Empire. All the world, like Caesar's Gaul, *in tres partes divisa est*. These new facts of power mean that all the lesser communities of Europe, Asia, and Latin America are now as defenseless in relationship to neighboring superpowers as were the preliterate Amerindians, Africans, and Melanesians when first assailed by white men equipped with Western technology. Of the five permanent members of the new Security Council, two are not

REGIONALISM AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

superpowers but only pseudo-powers: China has none of the industrial foundations of modern military might, while France lacks industry, people, and space. For an indefinite future, Washington, Moscow, and London either will rule the world together or will ruin the world in a new rivalry among themselves for global hegemony. In the language of Oswald Spengler, we are passing out of the Epoch of Contending States into the Age of World Empires.

While these elementary truths have received due notice in the literature of geopolitics and military science, they have been reflected dimly and, as through a glass, darkly, in much of the literature of international law and organization and in the public utterances of statesmen and diplomats. On the one hand, a few daring revolutionists, including, for a brief moment, Winston Churchill in the disastrous June of 1940, have urged international federation as a modern means of replacing global anarchy by global government and recapturing the ancient dream of a world state. For the present this vision is dead, despite the fact that federalism is a basic principle of the organization of power in the United States, the Soviet Union, and the British Commonwealth. Among the delegates at the Golden Gate, only T. V. Soong suggested the desirability of a pooling of sovereignties. Commander Stassen, who believes in federalism, refrained from urging it publicly, knowing that it had already been repudiated in the Atlantic Charter, the Moscow Conference Declaration, the Connally Resolution, and the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. On the other hand, all heads of states and almost all leaders of opinion throughout the United Nations have

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

made elaborate genuflections to the ideal of a world association of fifty-odd sovereignties, all equal in rights and duties, all preserving their sovereignty intact, and all pledged to keep the peace through the coercion of peace-breaking sovereignties by the collective power of peace-loving sovereignties. This conception is of the essence of the whole modern structure of international law, diplomatic practice, and world organization. But it mirrors the realities of a world which is forever dead, just as the vision of world federation is the reflection of a world powerless to be born. The words in both cases have no current equivalents in the experiences of political life by which men are obliged to shape their public preferences and decisions.

GOLDEN RULES AT THE GOLDEN GATE

The interesting problem of why and how all the peoples of the United Nations have embraced verbal formulas which are so widely at variance with facts can scarcely be resolved here. Suffice it to note that the magic words, "sovereign equality," "nonaggression," and "nonintervention," which might seem to express general guilt over the political practices usually called Machiavellian, have gained currency in each national community in part because they are convenient symbols with which to oppose other national communities. "Power politics" as a term of denigration always refers to the diplomacy of rivals; one's own policies of similar import are invariably called "national defense." Programs of aggrandizement are called "imperialism" when pursued by others but when pursued by one's own community are termed "manifest destiny," the "white man's

REGIONALISM AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

burden," or the protection of "vital interests" or "national honor." The out-group indulges in intervention, aggression, and violations of the sovereign equality of states; the in-group, even when doing precisely the same things, is merely helping the needy, aiding the weak, and safeguarding the sovereignty of others from external threats. Our side is the right side, and your side is the wrong side. Or, as Carlyle once put it, orthodoxy is my doxy and heterodoxy is your doxy.

Thus the principle of the sovereign equality of states has been appealed to at various times by all states against other states whose preponderance was distasteful—as, for example, by Latin Americans against the Colossus of the North. More recently, under the Good Neighbor policy, the United States has employed the same principle, along with the formula of nonintervention, to reassure and placate Latin America. The injunction of nonintervention was invoked by Moscow against the Western democracies during their assault of 1918-19, by the Western democracies against Moscow in defense against Communist propaganda, by France and Britain as a means of appeasing the Axis during the Spanish War, and by all the United Nations against the Fascist Triplice during World War II. To take but a single example of the confusions engendered by these practices, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, when protesting against Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States in July, 1940, conveniently forgot that the United States had originally championed the inclusion of the Baltic States within Russia and had itself, once upon a time, taken Panama; occupied Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua; and intervened in

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Cuba as recently as 1933 through an ambassador named Sumner Welles. Using the current vocabulary in its purest form, he declared: "The people of the United States are opposed to predatory activities no matter whether they are carried on by the use of force or by the threat of force. They are likewise opposed to any form of intervention on the part of one state, however powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other sovereign state, however weak."

Similar uses have been made of the formulas of nonaggrandizement and nonrecognition of the fruits of conquest. Thanks to the commendable predisposition of most of mankind to prefer virtue to vice, at least in words if not in deeds, all these semantic weapons are helpful to the weak in embarrassing the strong and useful to the less powerful in discrediting the more powerful. The very words which label power politics as wicked are themselves tools of power politics. Simple souls readily conclude that power itself is evil and that weakness is to be equated with goodness, an assumed correlation of qualities which is seldom a safe guide in foreign policy. The physiological consequences of such conditioning lead quite naturally—psychologically if not logically—to the further conclusion that international peace and security are best assured by committing all states to nonaggrandizement, nonintervention, and respect for the sovereign equality of all states. Any resemblance between these words and the facts of international life is purely coincidental.

These formulas are the bases of the San Francisco Charter. The nonaggrandizement principle, which was Point No. 1 of the Atlantic Charter, is included only by

REGIONALISM AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

implication, perhaps because by the spring of 1945 the three major United Nations were all appreciably aggrandized as compared with 1941. The other principles appear in full flower. Article 2, Section 1, declares that "the organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members," while Sections 3, 4, and 5 champion nonviolence, nonaggression, and non-intervention, and Section 7 bars the United Nations from intervening "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State." A dash of world federation is thrown in for flavoring in the form of championship of individual rights, which, of course, can be protected internationally only through a truly federal union with power to make law enforceable on individuals in courts. The Preamble begins, like the Constitution of the United States, "We, the peoples of the United Nations," but ends more accurately by saying that "our respective governments, through representatives assembled who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter." The document is a treaty among sovereign governments and no more resembles a federal constitution among peoples than did the Treaties of Westphalia, the Holy Alliance, or the League Covenant.

The Charter, in short, does not alter in any fundamental way the traditional concepts of international law and diplomacy or the established structure of the Western state system as a congeries of theoretically equal sovereignties. It reiterates the principles of international rectitude and self-denial which have long been praised by all right-thinking citizens pursuing interna-

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

tional morality and long been ignored by all realistic governments pursuing national interests. The principles are noble. I would not be understood as repudiating them or as criticizing the framers of the Charter for stating them so eloquently. I would merely ask you to notice that when the words in the vocabulary are compared with the realities of the world, they seem a little bit like the flowers that bloom in the spring, in that they have nothing to do with the case.

But all of this, as Mark Twain said of Richard Wagner, is not nearly so bad as it sounds. It would have been altogether unfortunate had the United Nations unreservedly committed themselves to sovereign equality, non-aggrandizement, and nonintervention with no loopholes in the straight jacket of righteousness. The superpowers will, in fact, continue to control their respective regional blocs and spheres by whatever means are necessary to make that control effective. The sardines and the whales in the sea of world politics will continue to be unequal. Washington, London, and Moscow will continue to hold strategic territories deemed necessary for defense. All will continue to intervene in the states within their security zones, as the U.S.S.R. has already done in Iran, Poland, and the Balkans; as Britain has done in Iran, Italy, Greece, Belgium, and Syria; and as the United States has done in Iceland, Greenland, the Caribbean, South America, and the Far East. Methods will continue to vary. The basic weapons of all power, as Machiavelli pointed out, are force, fraud, and favors. Russians specialize in force, as all know who have read about "Bolshevik brutality." Britishers specialize in fraud, as all know who have read about "British

REGIONALISM AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

hypocrisy." Americans specialize in favors, as all know who have read about graft, gravy, and boondoggling. Each of the Big Three can learn much from the others about the most effective combination of techniques for insuring a maximum of control over the weaker sovereignties within the respective spheres with a minimum of resentment and friction. That such control will continue to be exercised is as certain as the movements of the planets about the sun and of the satellites around the planets.

Fortunately, the Charter has been so cleverly contrived that, despite the negative platitudes with which it is embellished, the three whales are given a legal basis for their collective global hegemony without undue offense to the sardines. The Leviathans are even provided with methods for gearing together their own interests and policies without being paralyzed by verbal abstractions having no demonstrable relationship to their interests and policies. This circumstance should be welcomed and not deplored, because the facts of life are better than you think and will not be changed no matter what you think. "God help Israel," as Elmer Davis once observed, "if the prophets ever get the upper hand."

PIECEMEAL PEACE

Now let us notice what the Charter says about regional blocs and spheres. Articles 52-54, comprising chapter viii, deal with regional arrangements. No one need be confused because Article 52 refers back to Articles 34 and 35, while Article 35 refers back to 11 and 12, and Article 11 refers back to 35, 12 and 10, and

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Article 10 refers back to 12. This is all quite necessary and quite simple to international lawyers. If you do not understand the cross-references, my old teacher, Quincy Wright, will be able to explain them to you at the drop of a hat without batting an eyelash. The meat of the matter, which requires no red points, is that under the Charter the United Nations and the Security Council will foster regional arrangements and agencies for peace, but no enforcement action will be taken by such agencies without the authorization of the Security Council except action against enemy states in World War II, and action of "individual or collective self-defense" against armed attack under Article 51.

This would seem to mean that if the United States, as recommended in the Act of Chapultepec, should conclude a treaty with the other American republics for collective coercion of aggressors, any action taken under it would have to be approved ultimately by the Security Council, save in so far as such action might be performed in self-defense or be directed against Germany, Italy, Japan, or their allies—a rather improbable contingency in the Western Hemisphere in the near future. This also means that action in Europe to prevent any rearmament or renewed aggression by the late Axis under the terms of the alliance treaties between the Soviet Union and Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Poland (all of which are limited in their applicability to this eventuality) can be taken by the signatories independently of the Security Council.

This represents an advance over the old League Covenant and offers promise of swift, effective, and collective action in Europe against any possible attempt at

REGIONALISM AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

revanche by the vanquished. The existing regional security systems could readily be co-ordinated in a global security system under the terms of chapter viii of the Charter if the United States, as Senator Vandenburg urged last January, should conclude a treaty of alliance with Britain and the Soviet Union or, still better, with these plus France and China, to insure that Germany and Japan will remain defeated. This may be too much to hope for. But in any event regional security arrangements, loosely integrated by the Charter itself, will operate independently when directed against recent and present enemies and will operate with the authorization of the Security Council in all other cases, meaning that the three superpowers plus China and France plus two nonpermanent members must approve of such actions.

IN TRUSTEES WE TRUST

Articles 73-91, comprising chapters xi, xii, and xiii of the Charter, deal with nonself-governing territories, with the International Trusteeship system, and with the Trusteeship Council. The latter will consist of states administering trust territories, plus the other members of the Big Five, plus an equal number of states not administering trust territories and elected by the General Assembly. The Trusteeship Council, like the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League, has no power to make decisions regarding trust territories but may consider, consult, inspect, and advise. These provisions would appear to afford an appreciable measure of protection, through the weapon of publicity, against exploitation and abuse and some assurance of progress toward "self-government or independence," without un-

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

duly limiting, meanwhile, the effective control of trust territories by the trustee states. The territories to be so administered are not listed in the Charter, but it is stipulated that they may include, by agreement among the states concerned, the present mandated territories; other territories detached from enemy states in World War II—which could mean the Italian colonies and Formosa, Korea, various Japanese islands, and possibly Thailand; and such additional territories as the states ruling them may voluntarily place under the system—which could mean all colonies and dependencies or none. Any such territories may be administered by a single member of the United Nations or by several in agreement.

By Articles 82 and 93, moreover, there may be established in any trust territory a strategic area or areas, with respect to which the supervisory functions of the United Nations shall be exercised by the Security Council aided by the Trusteeship Council, whereas in non-strategic areas within trust territories these functions shall be exercised by the General Assembly, aided by the Trusteeship Council. The Security Council must approve the terms of trusteeship agreements, as well as alterations or amendments, for strategic areas, while the General Assembly must do likewise for trust territories not designated as strategic areas.

All of this is most ingenious, heartening, and hopeful, not because it means self-determination and sovereign independence for everybody the day after tomorrow but because it means that the three superpowers, decently clothed in the garments of respectability and legality, are herewith enabled to rule large areas of the

REGIONALISM AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

world outside their own frontiers. This is precisely as it should be, because either the Big Three will rule the world or it will not be ruled at all, in which case heaven help us! Moscow will retain its regional security system in Slavic Europe and in Mongolia and its alliances with France and Britain. Britain will preserve its empire, make what regional security arrangements it likes, probably retain control of the Italian colonies, and rechristen some of its other possessions "trust territories," thereby avoiding the deplorable appearance of aggrandizement or intervention. The United States will retain its hegemony over Latin America. The Navy will keep some of the Japanese islands, won at such fearful cost, with no imputation of conquest, since they will not be annexed but merely labeled "strategic areas." All the superpowers, to be sure, will be subject to the control of the Security Council, but, in so far as it functions effectively, the Security Council will be indistinguishable from the superpowers. The smaller fry will be policed by the Big Three. A policeman's lot, we have been told by Gilbert and Sullivan, is not a happy one. But in this case it may not prove unhappy, since the so-called "veto" means that the three policemen will not police one another. This, again, is as it should be, since any such effort would spell not world peace but world war.

ON TRUSTING THE ENEMY

Since it would be out of character for me to close with words of unrestrained optimism or to leave the reader in a mood of uncritical euphoria, let me conclude with a novel suggestion and with a word of warning.

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The suggestion is, I believe, new and is by way of addenda to this and to Mr. Arthur Burns's paper. It is that the United Nations solve the difficult and thorny problem of the status of Germany and the prospective status of Japan by converting both communities, within whatever new frontiers may be agreed upon by the victors, into trust territories under the International Trusteeship System provided for in the Charter. There can be no effective unity among the superpowers without a common program for Germany and Japan which will insure that they do not again become powers and will, at the same time, afford to their peoples some measure of hope for the future, along with reparation for past crimes, and some promise of eventual self-government on a democratic basis. These necessities cannot be served by mere military occupation and administration. Neither can they be served, sensibly and humanely, by any program of depopulation, de-industrialization, or territorial partition. Still less could they be promoted by restoring German and Japanese sovereignty and concluding treaties with new governments in Berlin and Tokyo. There is no present basis for democratic governments. Dictatorial regimes, whether of the Right or of the Left, would evade the treaties and disrupt Anglo-American-Soviet unity. I submit that the best way of attaining the objectives to which we are committed would be to apply chapters xi, xii, and xiii of the Charter to both the major enemy communities.

Let me ask you to re-read these chapters on the assumption that their provisions apply to Germans and Japanese rather than to Berbers, Bantus, or Bushmen. You will in this case make several remarkable discover-

REGIONALISM AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

ies. One is that the term "colonial," curiously enough, is not mentioned even once in these eighteen articles and that all of them can be applied in full to Germany and Japan without altering a single word or comma. They are addressed only to "members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibility for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government" and are presumably not yet capable of self-government. Germans and Japanese deserve to be first on the list. Another discovery is that the trusteeship for Germany which I am urging, as well as that for Japan, could easily be joint, with all interested powers participating. Still another novelty here—and this is "curiouser and curiouser," as Alice would say—is that these articles contain an admirable statement of the goals which the United Nations ought to pursue in dealing with Germans and Japanese, if they are to serve their own best interests and give any concrete political meaning to the ideals of the Jewish-Greek-Christian tradition of our common civilization.

Such an arrangement as I am here proposing would strengthen the bonds of unity among America, Britain, and the Soviet Union by requiring them, as trustees on behalf of all the United Nations, to grapple jointly, rather than in separate zones of occupation, with the political, economic, and administrative problems posed by the German and Japanese communities and to solve these problems in an enlightened and constructive fashion within the framework of a truly co-operative enterprise. Such an arrangement would preserve the economic unity of both areas and contribute to the rehabili-

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

tation and re-education of their inhabitants in a far more effective fashion than any other procedure thus far suggested. At any rate, in the absence of any alternative program of joint action, serious thought deserves to be given to a United Nations trusteeship for the Reich and Japan as a means of promoting justice for their peoples and of keeping the major United Nations united.

E PLURIBUS UNUM

My final word of warning, while trite, is, I trust, true and timely. It is simply that there can be no peace and security for any of us, or for any of the sons and daughters of men anywhere, in the years ahead unless the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Soviet Union act together. Destiny summons them to the noble and desperately necessary task of governing the world, co-operatively, intelligently, generously, and wisely, through the new League of Nations—which will turn to dust and ashes unless they do—and through sagacious and patient diplomacy among themselves, supported by an informed public opinion among their peoples. If they fail, all will be lost—all hope for order and peace, all promise of freedom and abundance, all prospect for a world fit to live in and worthy of the sacrifice of the millions who have given their last full measure of devotion to our common cause. If the superpowers, in their mission of mastery over the world, become rivals instead of partners, all small nations will be trampled down in the combat of the giants, all colonial peoples will become puppets of clashing imperialisms, all human rights and liberties will be sacrificed on the altar of Mars in a global war which neither side can win

REGIONALISM AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

but in which both sides will reduce what is left of Western culture to a rubble-heap.

The road which leads away from this catastrophe will be long and hard. Moscow, Teheran, Yalta, San Francisco, and Berlin are but way stations during the early stages of the journey. There will be needed a more precise definition of spheres of influence and of the limits and purposes of tolerable unilateral action by each and of desirable joint action by all within each sphere. There will be needed a flexible balance of power among the Three in order that an effective concert of power can be maintained. There will be needed a joint program in dealing with China and with the Near and Middle East, as well as with Germany and Japan. There will be needed, above all in America, less loose thinking and a more candid and sympathetic appreciation of the difficult economic problems and vital strategic interests of postwar Britain and postwar Russia.

Given these things (and without them we cannot live), there will still remain two major dangers of conflict which we must somehow meet and overcome. One is the danger of another great depression in the United States. Karl Marx was right in predicting that competitive capitalism would evolve into monopolistic capitalism, and that monopolistic capitalism, left to itself, would destroy itself. Karl Marx was wrong in believing that proletarian social revolution would or could be the result. The proletariat is a class declining in numbers and influence in every advanced industrial society. The lower middle class has long been the rising and growing social stratum. In our kind of society, that class, when confronted with prolonged economic stagnation, unem-

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

ployment, and material and spiritual anguish, tends to find its soul by losing its mind. Fascism is not an Italian or German phenomenon. Another great depression could mean fascism in America. There can be no collaboration or peace between a Fascist America and a socialist Soviet Union. War with Russia under any circumstances may well convert America into a Fascist state. An America that goes Fascist in the course of another disastrous business debacle will inevitably fight Russia. One of our major duties to peace and to the democratic dream is to put our economic house in order.

The second danger to unity springs from misunderstanding of the global geography of power politics. Sir Halford J. Mackinder, seconded by Karl Haushofer, founder of Geopolitik, swore by the maxim: "Who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland of Eurasia; who rules the Heartland, commands the World Island of Europe, Asia, and Africa; who rules the World Island commands the world." Already many voices are raised in America demanding that we act to checkmate Soviet power in eastern Europe as a means of thwarting a Soviet bid for world hegemony. But the premise is false. Never in recorded time, not even in the time of the great Mongol Empire, have the rulers of Eurasia and eastern Europe commanded the World Island or threatened the world. The late Nicholas Spykman, foremost American student of geopolitics, was more nearly right in saying in his last book:

"Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world. Already the United States has gone to war twice within thirty years

REGIONALISM AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

and the threat to our security each time has been the possibility that the Rimland regions of the Eurasian land mass would be dominated by a single Power. . . . The Heartland becomes less important than the Rimland and it is the cooperation of British, Russian and United States land and sea power that will control the European (and Asiatic) littoral and, thereby, the essential power relations of the world."

There is no possible menace to America or Britain in Soviet control of Europe east of the Elbe and the Adriatic, all of which inevitably falls within the sphere of influence and regional security system directed from Moscow. Anglo-American security would be jeopardized only by Soviet control of the Eurasian rimlands: China, India, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic shores of Europe. At the same time, any Anglo-American effort to organize these rimland regions, which inevitably fall within the British and American spheres, as bases against the Soviet Union would be a mortal threat to Muscovy and would be resisted, if need be, by arms. Let us hope that no such purpose will move the policy-makers of London and Washington in the years to come and that mutual toleration and co-operation, rather than rivalry, will be the rule in the intermediate areas between the spheres. One of our major duties to peace and world security is to understand the pattern of world power in the twentieth century, lest, by misunderstanding it once more, we take the road to World War III and find ourselves obliged to say again that "all our yesterdays have lighted fools the way to dusty death."

I leave you with the last words of Franklin D. Roose-

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

vult to the American people, written the night before he died:

"....The mere conquest of our enemies is not enough. We must go on to do all in our power to conquer the doubts and the fears, the ignorance and the greed, which made this horror possible. Thomas Jefferson, himself a distinguished scientist, once spoke of the 'brotherly spirit of science, which unites into one family all its votaries of whatever grade, and however widely dispersed throughout the different quarters of the globe.'

"Today science has brought all the different quarters of the globe so close together that it is impossible to isolate them one from another. Today we are faced with the pre-eminent fact that, if civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships—the ability of all peoples, of all kinds, to live together and work together, in the same world, at peace.

"Today, as we move against the terrible scourge of war—as we go forward toward the greatest contribution that any generation of human beings can make in this world—the contribution of lasting peace, I ask you to keep up your faith. I measure the sound, solid achievement that can be made at this time by the straight-edge of your own confidence and your resolve. And to you, and to all Americans who dedicate themselves with us to the making of an abiding peace, I say:

"The only limit to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today. Let us move forward with strong and active faith."

WORLD ORGANIZATION ON THE ECONOMIC FRONTS

By EUGENE STALEY

ONE of the most noteworthy features of the United Nations Charter and of the reception given to it by the public is the prominent role of its economic and social provisions. At San Francisco many governments in their official commentaries on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals suggested ways to strengthen the Economic and Social Council. Seven of them specifically proposed that it be listed among the "principal organs" of the United Nations Organization. This was done, thus adding to the prestige of this side of the Organization's activities. The representatives of some forty influential American groups who had been invited to act as consultants to the United States delegation showed a very strong interest in the economic and social aspects of the Charter. A further testimony to the concern of governments, and of the public opinion behind governments, with the economic and social side of world organization is found in the provisions of the United Nations Charter on trusteeship, which stress the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the peoples in nonself-governing areas. As for the reception accorded the Charter since the San Francisco Conference, there appears to be a wide body of opinion which views the economic and social provisions as no less important, and perhaps for the long pull more im-

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

portant, to the welfare and security of the world's peoples than the direct security provisions themselves.

All this is a far cry from the official and popular attitudes of not so many years ago. As will be shown later, the need for international co-operation at the time of the launching of the League of Nations was thought of mostly in political terms. How account for the greatly increased attention now being given to the economic and social side of world organization? Three reasons, among many others that might be found, are especially important.

First, the peoples of the world have been brought to an acute realization of the economic and social interdependence among nations—accentuated by recent startling developments in radio, aviation, and other modern forms of communication and by the experience of the world depression of the thirties and the world war of the forties. Second, the increased economic and social activity of governments makes intergovernmental organization in this field more necessary. Third, it is recognized that among the causes of war which must be dealt with by an adequate peace system are the underlying economic and social maladjustments which produce unemployment, hunger, and poverty and thus prepare the ground for seeds to be sown by demagogues like Hitler and Mussolini.

In the days when we used to have debates between "internationalists" and "isolationists," one of the favorite internationalist slogans was "Peace is indivisible." There were self-styled realists who pooh-poohed that idea. No doubt it would be hard to prove that in no theoretically conceivable case could one major part of the

WORLD ORGANIZATION ON THE ECONOMIC FRONTS

world, such as America, remain at peace while other major parts of the world in Europe or Asia were drawn into war. Yet, as most reasonable men now admit, the practical truth of the saying "Peace is indivisible" has been demonstrated to the hilt by the course of events in the spread of two world wars.

Now we are beginning to realize also that prosperity, like peace, is indivisible. Just as there cannot be one peace for Europe, another for America, another for Asia, so there cannot be durable economic welfare for one major part of the world while other major parts suffer from chronic poverty or recurrent depression. Again, it would be hard to prove this as a theoretically airtight proposition. There are methods, highly developed in the last few decades, of insulating one national economy from another. Also, there are divergent economic systems in the world, represented by the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other; and it could be that they would develop with relatively little mutual trade or investment or other forms of economic interchange—although that does not seem the most likely course of events. In any case, the practical, realistic truth is likely to be one of growing interdependence. The basic forces of technology will continue to shrink the world, and the economic fortunes of the peoples of the world will be linked. If they co-operate through mutual trade and investment and exchange of technology, the linkage will be continuous and obvious, and it is likely to be, for the most part, mutually helpful. If, on the other hand, nations, empires, or blocs separate themselves into supposedly insulated compartments and deliberately keep their economic ties at a minimum,

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

there will still be political interaction among them, and their economic fortunes—or misfortunes—would, under such circumstances, probably be linked by competitive preparation for war and sooner or later by mutual destruction. The point is that, for good or ill, the economic fortunes of different parts of the world are, in all likelihood, going to be linked more closely in the future than ever before, and the peoples of the world are beginning to realize this.

Second, the direct influence of governments on economic and social matters has been growing apace, and this makes intergovernmental organization in the economic and social field more and more imperative. If governments practiced *laissez faire* internally, then international economic relations might also take place in a cosmopolitan free-market setting under the regulation of “automatic” forces of supply and demand. International organization, like internal government, would concern itself mainly with preserving a framework of order and property rights. The direct economic and social functions of a world league would be minor. Where economic and social life is extensively managed or regulated by the state, however, as it is today, international contacts make it essential to have a multitude of interstate agreements and to achieve at least some degree of co-ordination in policies, and international organization must concern itself with such matters.

Third, and probably most important of all in explaining the popular interest in the economic and social side of the United Nations Charter, is the realization that the roots of war are to be found partly in bad economic and social conditions. Field Marshal Smuts, opening

WORLD ORGANIZATION ON THE ECONOMIC FRONTS

the Commission meeting of the San Francisco Conference at which the economic and social section of the Charter was approved, observed that one of the weaknesses of the League Covenant was that it did not pay any particular attention to this supremely important subject. "The approach of the Covenant was almost entirely political, and the effort there made was to deal by political methods with the prevention of war. We have seen that social and economic unrest is one of the more prolific causes of war. We have learned our lesson . . . and it is because of this new experience that the omission of the Covenant is now apparent and is being remedied in this new draft for the new Organization."

World peace cannot be preserved by force alone. Of course, it is extremely important that the United Nations be in a position to organize force against an aggressor. Yet a world seething with economic and social discontent could hardly be kept in order for long by "sitting on the lid." A sound, progressive world economic environment is vitally important to the success of the international security system, and part of the task of the United Nations Organization is to promote such an environment.

The international security system is bound to be fragile at best. The United Nations Organization will be incapable of coercing a great power. Its influence will depend on the good will and willingness to co-operate of sovereign national states whose record for taking a broad view of the world interest as a part of their own enlightened self-interest has not been very good. We are not yet at the stage where it is practicable to have a world government with its own internationalized police

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

force, its own independent sources of funds, or authority to legislate or administer in matters of world concern. Until that stage is reached—and it will take a long time, though I firmly believe we should do what we can to speed the day—the peace and security of nations will necessarily rest on shaky foundations. The truth is that the world security system of today cannot stand much strain. In fact, it may be that the best hope we can reasonably have for the Security Council's work under the United Nations Charter is that it may succeed in preventing the outbreak of wars while the Assembly and its Economic and Social Council have a chance to make progress in a slower-moving but more fundamental task, which is to promote co-operation for economic and social advancement and thereby to lessen some of the tensions that make for war.

What kinds of strains may be imposed on the world peace system by a bad world economic environment? The most important are of two types.

The first arises out of economic depressions like that which we went through in the thirties. Workers cannot find jobs, businessmen face bankruptcy, investors lose the savings of a lifetime. This creates millions of frustrated individuals who are receptive to a pathological type of political leadership which blames their troubles on alleged internal or external enemies, and this leads to aggression and war.

Had there been no disastrous world depression after 1929, Hitler might never have come to power in Germany. The discontent engendered by the depression multiplied the Nazi party's following and lifted Hitler into dictatorship in 1933. In 1945 when Hitler was try-

WORLD ORGANIZATION ON THE ECONOMIC FRONTS

ing desperately to rally the German people for a last-ditch stand, it is significant that his radio speech recalled the economic troubles that existed in Germany when he took office—seven million unemployed, he said, and another seven million on part-time. He gave work to the unemployed, building armaments. If we permit bad economic depressions in the future, we shall have again a world of personal insecurity and frustration. Once more, frustrated individuals will prove a fertile soil for the demagoguery of new Hitlers who will blame the troubles of the people on minority groups like the Jews and who will preach aggression and war as the way of national salvation. In a prosperous, progressive environment of stable employment and gradually rising living standards, on the other hand, people are more likely to be optimistic and adjustable. There is more chance that political leaders will rise to the top who will be willing to consider international co-operation and to settle disputes by compromise.

The other main economic factor with direct bearing on the prospect for war or peace is the policy of nations toward trade—especially their willingness to take imports. Not only do high import barriers stifle peaceful and mutually beneficial exchange of goods; they also ruin the prospects for sound international investment and development, which would help to speed up the progress of less developed countries.

We in the United States must remember that most countries, especially the smaller countries with resources much less diversified than ours, depend to a greater extent than we do upon imports and exports. Trade-restricting policies, especially when adopted by great

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

market areas like the United States or the British Empire, do give plausibility to the propaganda line used by the Germans and the Japanese in the thirties. In order to have "access to raw materials," they argued, or to provide a high standard of living for their increasing population, they must go out and conquer territory where their trade would not be at the mercy of other countries' import policies. Thus they built up demands for "living space" and "co-prosperity spheres." In this way high protective tariffs and other import barriers are a direct incitement to aggression and empire-building. This does not justify German and Japanese aggression. But there is considerable truth in the saying: "If goods cannot cross boundaries, soldiers will."

What needs to be done in a positive way in order to get the favorable world economic environment in which a security system can have a fair chance to work? Three things are most important. First, the "business cycle"—those disastrous ups and downs of boom and depression—must be brought under control. A reasonably high level of sustained prosperity, something approaching the "full employment" which it is the declared purpose of the United Nations Organization to promote, would go far to make other problems solvable. This requires concerted measures in many countries, internationally co-ordinated; the success or failure of the full employment policy in the United States will probably be the most decisive factor of all in the success or failure of a world full employment policy. Second, there must be rapid economic reconstruction and then continued, progressive economic development throughout the world.

WORLD ORGANIZATION ON THE ECONOMIC FRONTS

This is in order that the capacity of the world's peoples to produce may rise, enabling them to afford progressively rising standards of living. Concretely, economic development means the building of railroads, highways, and airlines, the improvement of water transport, installation of telephone and telegraph systems, the equipping of farmers with better implements and better farming methods, and the introduction or expansion of modern factories. Third, there must be a high level of two-way trade among nations, enabling them to specialize in their most effective types of production and to earn the means of foreign payment needed to buy raw materials and capital goods abroad and to pay back loans and investments.

These three conditions of a sound economic underpinning for a world peace system may be summed up this way: We need an expanding world economy—a world economy in which new railroads and airlines are being built, in which modern factories and modern agriculture are developing in areas that still use antiquated methods of work, in which improvements in production are bringing higher levels of living for advanced industrial countries and the less developed countries alike, in which employment is easy to get and reasonably steady, and in which trade flows in large volume within and among the nations. Here we have the immediate objectives for internationally co-ordinated action on the economic front.

Having considered some of the reasons for the increased amount of attention being given to the economic and social side of world organization, let us survey

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

the evolution of this phase of world organization over the past few decades.

There has been a fairly steady progression in the emphasis put on economic and social co-operation as a part of the broad task of world organization. The San Francisco Charter gives more weight and prestige to economic and social functions of the United Nations than was given by the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Dumbarton Oaks had already gone somewhat further in this respect than the latest practice of the League of Nations. The latest practice of the League of Nations, as evolved during twenty years, devoted much more attention to economic and social matters than had been contemplated by those who drafted the Covenant and participated in the first League sessions. Even the Covenant and the first League sessions, however, as compared with the international practice before World War I, represented a new departure in international concern with such matters.

There had been a number of pre-1914 efforts at limited intergovernmental organization in the economic field, mostly for the regulation of specific technical matters: the European Danube Commission, the Universal Postal Union, the International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, the International Sugar Convention, the International Institute of Agriculture, and a conference at The Hague to attempt to get greater uniformity in laws on bills of exchange. In general, these experiments in intergovernmental economic co-operation were confined to a very few specific problems in fields in which international action was clearly needed and relatively easy to realize; they were not concerned

WORLD ORGANIZATION ON THE ECONOMIC FRONTS

with problems of national policy involving strong conflicts of interest.¹

During the war of 1914-18 inter-Allied economic co-operation developed as a matter of military necessity. The *Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement*, created in August, 1914, was for the purpose of coordinating Allied orders for the armed forces in Great Britain; it was under British management and derived its strength and effectiveness largely from the fact that purchases had to be made with British credits. Later the principle of joint purchases was extended to commodities for civilian needs, and a so-called "Wheat Executive," which became the model for further inter-Allied co-operation in other fields, was set up to arrange for the allotment by agreement of all available wheat supplies. The shipping stringency led to the creation of a system of inter-Allied shipping control in the Allied Maritime Transport Council, and to the careful programming of requirements for shipment through program committees similar to the Wheat Executive just mentioned. These were finally merged in an Inter-Allied Munitions Council covering war materials and a Food Council covering foodstuffs. At no time, however, was executive power delegated to the inter-Allied economic organizations. They simply brought the appropriate agencies of national administrations together and

¹ Martin Hill, "The Economic and Financial Organization of the League of Nations: A Survey of Twenty-five Years' Experience," to be published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, in its series of "Studies in the Administration of International Law and Organization." From an advance copy, used here by permission of the Endowment.

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

achieved results through agreement of responsible officials.²

Largely owing to the opposition of the United States and, to a less degree, that of Great Britain, organized inter-Allied economic co-operation as developed during the first World War was suddenly dropped at the end of hostilities. The attempt was made to return at once to the uncontrolled free market in raw materials and in international trade and investment generally. It is now rather widely agreed that the sudden dropping of war-time economic controls and of their international co-ordination, without even a provision for a period of transition from war to peace, was a bad mistake. The United States showed concern with the problem of European food relief and in this field took action through its own official and private agencies. But the problem of rehabilitation, to achieve quick restoration of the productive powers of countries that had been impoverished so that they would need less relief, and the still larger problem of reconstruction of war-damaged economies were hardly tackled in a systematic way at all.

In setting up the League of Nations, statesmen gave relatively little attention to the economic side of peaceful international relations. The only references in the Covenant are in Article 22, providing for equal trading opportunities in the main categories of mandated territories (A and B mandates), and in Article 23 (*e*), which lays down the principle of "equitable treatment of the commerce of all Members of the League." Ideas put for-

² See *ibid.*, which is based largely on the works of J. A. (now Sir Arthur) Salter, *Allied Shipping Control: An Experiment in International Administration* (1921) and Étienne Clementel, *La France et la politique économique inter-alliée* (1931).

WORLD ORGANIZATION ON THE ECONOMIC FRONTS

ward in Italian and French quarters that there should be international control to insure equitable distribution of raw materials among nations got nowhere in the Peace Conference. "Even the suggestion made by several of the principal delegations that some form of economic committee be created within the League framework aroused opposition owing, it would seem, to fears of possible interference with matters held to be of domestic concern."³

The Peace Conference did, however, write a charter for the International Labor Organization, providing for tripartite representation of governments, workers, and employers. The formation of the I.L.O. was a notable forward step in organized international economic and social co-operation. During two decades the I.L.O. has developed the scope of its activities and interests from a concentration on labor standards, rather narrowly defined, to a very broad concern with all sorts of economic and social conditions affecting the lives of workers.

The League of Nations, in actual practice, under the influence of the changing events of twenty years, developed its economic and social activities to a degree that could hardly have been foreseen by reading the meager references to such matters in the Covenant. We can sum up this evolution briefly, since an excellent account of it has been written by Mr. Martin Hill of the League staff and will shortly be published by the Carnegie Endowment.⁴

Creation of the League's Economic and Financial Organization represented "an entirely new departure

³ Hill, *op. cit.*

⁴ *Ibid.* The discussion in the text is based on this study.

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

in peacetime interstate relationships, an experiment which was viewed in many quarters with no little apprehension." In the course of its work, consultation between officials engaged in framing and executing economic and social policies in different countries, which had been rare before 1914, became an established practice. The Economic and Financial Organization developed into the largest of the League's so-called "technical" organizations. Toward the end of this development it consisted of (1) the Coordination Committee (including the rapporteurs to the League Council on economic, financial, and fiscal problems); (2) the Economic, Financial, and Fiscal committees, the Committee of Statistical Experts, and various subcommittees and joint committees of these; (3) various *ad hoc* committees, such as the Delegation on Economic Depressions; and (4) the Secretariat, recently known as the Economic, Financial, and Transit Department. It performed important work in arranging international conferences, drawing up conventions, assisting governments to meet special economic problems, improving world economic statistics, and initiating economic studies.

A major development in the nature of the problems with which the League's Economic and Financial Organization concerned itself took place in the second of its two decades, largely as a result of the great depression of the thirties. In the first decade, in addition to undertaking specific work to aid in the financial and economic reconstruction of a number of European countries, it had dealt largely with the external economic relations among nations. Attempts were made to frame international conventions which, if adopted by the par-

WORLD ORGANIZATION ON THE ECONOMIC FRONTS

ticipating governments, would lessen the barriers to international trade and investment. In the second decade there was a definite shift of emphasis away from problems of external economic relations toward work on economic problems common to many countries but in the past considered to be internal and of only domestic concern. This same shift brought the League into much more direct contact with the problems of "welfare economics." Thus, the last years at Geneva and the continuation during the present war of the League's economic staff work at a temporary haven in Princeton, New Jersey, saw important work by League committees and by staff experts or consultants on the nature of booms and depressions and the best policies for controlling them; on nutrition in relation to health, agriculture, and economic policy; on conditions of rural life; and on measures for raising the standard of living. Some of this work, such as that on nutrition and agriculture, quite directly laid the groundwork for specialized agencies, such as the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, which are to carry on under the co-ordination of the new United Nations Organization. Furthermore, it seems likely that the shift in emphasis registered under the League will show itself from the first in the methods of approach and choice of problems to be adopted by the economic and social organs of the new world organization.

A direct continuation of League of Nations evolution can also be seen in the structural pattern chosen for the organization of economic and social functions under the United Nations Charter. Just before the outbreak of war in 1939 the so-called "Bruce Committee" of the

League considered major structural changes designed to make the economic and social work of the League more effective. The proposals of this committee, approved by the League Assembly in December, 1939, but never put into effect because of the war, called for creation of a Central Committee consisting, in the first instance, of twenty-four government representatives and not more than eight co-opted members. Through the Central Committee, the economic and social work was to be brought under the supervision of a representative body likely to be more effective in this task than the Assembly and the Council of the League, which were made up primarily of diplomats accustomed to dealing mainly with political questions.

No historical sketch of the antecedents of the United Nations Organization on the economic front can omit mention of the arrangements for economic co-operation during the recent war. It is not yet clear how much influence these are likely to have on the economic activities of the new peacetime organization. The basic pattern has been similar to that developed in the first World War, namely, no delegation of executive power to the inter-Allied economic agencies, but co-ordination of national measures through organized consultation of responsible officials from the different national administrations. Thus the Combined Raw Materials Board, the Combined Production and Resources Board, the Combined Shipping Adjustment Boards (recently followed by a United Maritime Authority with broadened membership), and the Combined Food Board have represented centers of joint planning between, in the first instance, British, American, and, on some boards, Cana-

WORLD ORGANIZATION ON THE ECONOMIC FRONTS

dian authorities. Economic relations with the Soviet Union and with other allies and neutrals have been organized through special committees or through regular or special diplomatic channels.

The question is arising again, as it did in 1918, whether these wartime methods of economic co-ordination, broadened as they would have to be in order to be more widely representative, are to be carried on during the transition from war to peace or are to be scrapped as soon as hostilities end. At San Francisco the French and other delegations stated with considerable emphasis the need, which their countrymen had also felt twenty-five years ago, for some kind of continued international control over allotment of raw materials necessary in reconstruction. Some of the countries interested in developing and modernizing their economies spoke of the parallel need for international aid in obtaining access to capital goods. The problem of how to meet these issues, not dealt with specifically in the Charter, will certainly arise as soon as the Economic and Social Council is organized.

Let us now look at the economic and social articles of the San Francisco Charter against the background of the preceding discussion. Certain points stand out. First, there is a list of purposes, and it is very broad. It includes promotion of higher standards of living; full employment; economic and social progress and development; solutions of international economic, social, health, and other related problems; cultural and educational co-operation; respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This is testimony to the growing sense of community in "one

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

world." Proposals to include many of these items in an international charter would have been shocking twenty-five years ago.

Second, the members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action, in co-operation with the organization, for the achievement of these purposes. This is another indication of the fact that economic conditions and policies in fields formerly thought to be of purely domestic concern are now seen to have an impact far beyond the boundaries of a single country. For example, an economic breakdown in the United States, resulting in unemployment and sharply reduced imports, would be of great concern to the Australians, who in this pledge have obtained recognition for a point they had brought forward at a number of international conferences, namely, that failure to maintain internal "full employment" may do greater damage to other countries than boosting tariff rates. Why should the latter be of international concern and not the former?

Third, the organizational machinery available to the United Nations in their co-operative quest for economic advancement and in their efforts to lessen the economic and social causes of war will consist of two main parts: the "specialized agencies established by intergovernmental agreement," on the one hand, and the organs created by the United Nations Charter, on the other. Thus, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, set up in 1943 as the first of the post-war United Nations agencies, will continue under its own articles of agreement to try to meet such problems as emergency food and clothing needs in war-stricken areas, aid to displaced persons, and revival of the most

WORLD ORGANIZATION ON THE ECONOMIC FRONTS

essential production in relief areas. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, about to begin its formal career after preparatory steps launched at the Hot Springs Conference in 1943, will concern itself with the means of getting better diets for malnourished people and a better living for farmers. The International Labor Organization will continue its work on labor standards, industrial relations, social security, and related problems. There are certain problems here of constitutional readjustment and of bringing back the Soviet Union. The international civil aviation organization, outlined at the Chicago Conference in 1944, will deal with the important new problems arising in that field. The two Bretton Woods organizations—the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for Reconstruction and Development—will operate under their own specialized charters in the fields of monetary stabilization and supply of capital for rebuilding war-devastated areas or for long-range development of production facilities. No doubt other agencies, in such fields as trade policy, commodity stabilization and supervision of commodity controls, cultural co-operation, and health, will be established; the Charter authorizes the United Nations Organization to initiate negotiations looking to the establishment of new specialized agencies.

This proliferation of specialized agencies, which is an interesting feature of the current attempt at international organization on the economic front, has certain advantages—mainly of a political character—but also raises serious problems of co-ordination.⁵ If there is one

⁵ Cf. Harry D. Gideonse, "Integration or Proliferation of International Economic Agencies," *Money and the Law: Proceedings of the Institute on*

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

leading characteristic of economic affairs, it is interdependence. For example, whether international investment for economic development is to be sound or unsound will depend ultimately on trade policies, and nothing very effective can be accomplished in the field of trade policy without some assurance regarding the international monetary policies that are to prevail, and so on.

The United Nations Charter attempts to meet this problem of co-ordination. The General Assembly is to elect an Economic and Social Council, consisting of eighteen member-states, which is to co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies by making recommendations to them, to the General Assembly (which is given power to examine the administrative budgets of the specialized agencies), and to the member-governments. It remains to be seen how this system will work in practice and how it may evolve.

In addition to its co-ordinating function, the Economic and Social Council also has wide latitude under the Charter to initiate studies and reports, to call conferences, to prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, and to make recommendations, which may be addressed to the General Assembly, to the member-states, or to the specialized agencies. It is contemplated that the Economic and Social Council will set up a number of commissions—such as an economic commission, a social commission, a commission on human rights. It will make arrangements for close liaison between its own deliberations and those of the special-

Money and the Law, held in New York City, January 15-16, 1945. Reprinted by the Economists' National Committee on Monetary Policy.

WORLD ORGANIZATION ON THE ECONOMIC FRONTS

ized agencies, and it is also authorized to arrange for consultation with nongovernmental organizations concerned with economic and social matters.

The Secretariat, of course, will be a very important adjunct in all of the economic and social work of the United Nations Organization. It is to be hoped that the economic staff of the Secretariat, while maintaining the high standards of competence and devotion set by the League's economic staff, will be very much more numerous. There should be representatives of the United Nations economic service in all the major cities of the world—and not merely in the capitals—gathering and disseminating impartial information.

One final observation may be offered. The General Assembly and its agent, the Economic and Social Council, have only recommendatory power under the United Nations Charter. They have no executive power. The Security Council, in its field, is to have some executive power; it will have contingents of armed forces placed at its disposal, in advance of the need for them, and it will be able to employ them, by a prescribed vote, without going back to the individual national governments for further authorization. The Economic and Social Council and the Assembly have no analogous resources; they do not have at their collective command either policemen, tax gatherers, capital funds, or the other items of administrative apparatus that enable governments to take action in the economic field.

However, some of the specialized agencies are to have a certain amount of executive power within their prescribed fields, and this represents an important advance in international organization. The United Nations Re-

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

lief and Rehabilitation Administration has executive power to use a pool of supplies placed at its disposal by member-governments. The Bank for Reconstruction and Development will be able to approve or disapprove projects and to lend or pledge a limited amount of capital funds. The International Monetary Fund can take important decisions, not merely make recommendations to its members.

This nascent executive power in the hands of international economic agencies marks a significant trend. It is a trend that needs to be continued and extended. There are many aspects of economic and social problems these days that can best be dealt with by common action at the world level rather than by separate, or even co-ordinated, action at the national level. We need to develop real instruments of government at the world level as well as at the national, provincial, and local levels. The architects of the United Nations Charter decided, however—and they are probably right for the time being—that the nations are not yet ready to give executive powers in the economic and social field to organs of the United Nations, except here and there, piecemeal, for very specific purposes, and under rigid limitations.

The moral is that the United Nations Organization, especially on its economic and social side, is essentially a device for facilitating consultation among member-governments and for making collective recommendations to them. Nothing really happens unless the national governments, through national legislative and administrative machinery, make it happen. Hence, adoption of the United Nations Charter is merely a begin-

WORLD ORGANIZATION ON THE ECONOMIC FRONTS

ning. The real test comes after that. Will our government and the other governments use it and give effect to the collective recommendations made under it? Or will our government and the others insist on handling economic relations, as before, through unilateral national agencies on an unco-operative, unco-ordinated basis?

The other day I read a newspaper report quoting Senator Robert A. Taft as follows: "I am strongly in favor of international cooperation in the political field and I intend to support the Charter." Then he went on to deny a parallel need for international economic co-operation, to attack the proposed international Bank and Fund, and to urge that we rely instead on our own nationally controlled Export-Import Bank.⁶ Senator Taft, you see, has now almost caught up with the thinking of twenty-five years ago; he now favors political co-operation, but not economic. A remark of one of our abler newspaper commentators sums up the situation well. Said Marquis Childs in a column on "isolationists' tactics":

"Public opinion is overwhelmingly for ratification of the San Francisco Charter. . . . It is much easier to oppose something like Bretton Woods. . . . This may be the reason for the change in tactics of the isolationists. . . . In other words, you can give internationalism a condescending pat on the head by voting for the Charter, and then vote against the means to help make it work."⁷

There is the real point for enlightened public opinion to watch.

⁶ *Washington Star*, July 12, 1945.

⁷ *Washington Post*, June 28, 1945.

INDEX

- Aggression, eliminating will to, 25, 27, 28
- Air power, 78, 79
- Atlantic Charter, 89, 92
- Autarchy, 31-32, 39, 41
- Balance of power, 67, 76, 81, 103
- Barbosa, Senhor Ruy, 68
- Bartlett, Ruhl J., 70 n.
- Bieberstein, Marschall von, 77 n.
- Bretton Woods, 125, 129
- Brodie, Bernard, 8
- "Bruce Committee," 121
- Bryce, James (Viscount), 70 n.
- Cairo declaration, 36
- Carter, Charles F., 70 n.
- Chicago Conference, 125
- Childs, Marquis, 129
- Churchill, Winston, 89
- Clementel, Étienne, 118 n.
- Collective security, 64, 76, 80, 97, 102
- Community of states, 14, 15, 17, 19, 58, 61, 71-72, 73, 85
- Compromise of Vienna, 62
- Compulsory adjudication; *see* International disputes, compulsory adjudication of
- Conference of Ambassadors, 75
- "Co-prosperity spheres," 114
- Corbett, Percy E., 11
- Crimea Conference, 25, 41, 45
- Demilitarization; *see* Disarmament
- Denazification, 26, 28, 46, 47, 54-55
- Dickinson, G. Lowes, 70 n.
- Disarmament: benefits of, 41; and Compromise of Vienna, 62; control of imports as, 36-38; and future output, 50; and Hague Conferences, 66; immediate necessity for, 40; industrial and economic, 26, 31-33; losses of, 42; as prerequisite to world peace, 43; reparation as, 47; seizure of assets as, 48; territorial separation as, 33 ff.
- Dumbarton Oaks, 11, 89, 107, 116
- Economic co-operation among nations, 116-18, 122
- Economic depression, 27, 46, 103-4, 108, 109, 112-13, 114
- Economic interdependence, 108-9
- Economy: disruption of, in wartime, 35; central control of, as factor in reparation, 46
- Equality of nations; *see* Power relationships
- Evatt, Dr. Herbert Vere, 78
- Fly, James L., 8
- Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, 5-6
- Four Power Pact, 76
- Germany: ascetic idealism of, 56; benefits and losses from disarmament of, 41-43; breakdown in 1918 reparations from, 44; control of imports from, as disarmament, 36-38; Crimean policy toward, 25-26; and economic depression, 112-13; factors in reparation from, 47; future output as

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

- principal source of reparation from, 50; labor as reparation from, 49, 51-52; need for immediate disarmament of, 40; as possible trusteeship, 100-102; production facilities as reparation from, 47; reparation in kind from, 45; restriction of industrial development of, 31-33; seizure of assets of, in foreign countries, 48-50; separation of industrial territory of, 33-36; standard of living of, 41-42, 46, 47, 53, 54; war as dominant ideal of, 27; war industries, removal from, 30, 31-32; war materials of, in natural resources, 37; will to aggression, removal of, 25, 28; withdrawal of, from League of Nations, 76
- Gideonse, Harry F., 125 n.
- Goering, 77 n.
- Good Neighbor policy, 91
- Goodrich, Carter, 8
- Graham, M. W., 63 n.
- Hague Conferences, 66, 67, 68 n., 69, 75 n., 77 n.
- Haushofer, Karl, 77 n., 104
- Herriot, 75
- Hill, Martin, 117 n., 119 n.
- Hobbes, Thomas, 86
- Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 25
- Hull, William I., 70 n.
- Industrial capacity, distribution of, among world powers, 88
- Industrial restriction: as disarmament, 26, 31-33; as control of war potential, 33
- International Court of Justice, 11, 21-22, 24
- International disputes, compulsory adjudication of, 22, 24
- International Labor Organization, 71, 119, 125
- International law, 6, 14-15, 61 n.
- International society; *see* Community of states
- International Trusteeship system, 97, 100
- Internationalism, 7, 108
- Intervention; *see* Nonintervention
- Isolationism, 7, 108
- Japan: ascetic idealism of, 56; control of imports from, as disarmament, 38; industrial controls, 32; industrial disarmament of, 36; natural resources of, as war materials, 37; rejection of labor as reparation from, 49; removal of industries from, 30, 36; separation of territory from, as disarmament of, 36; war as dominant ideal of, 27; will to aggression, removal of, 28
- Jessup, Philip C., 8
- Justice, 11-14, 18, 22, 23, 85
- Labor, as reparation, 49, 51-53
- Lawrence, T. J., 58 n., 59 n.
- League of Nations, 7, 71, 74, 75, 77, 80, 81, 93, 96, 102, 108, 111, 116, 117 n., 118-22
- "Living space," 114
- MacDonald, Premier, 75
- Makinder, Halford J., 104
- Marburg, Theodor, 70 n.
- Marx, Karl, 103
- Mickle, Joe J., 8
- Miller, D. H., 61 n.
- Monetary stabilization, 125-26
- Morgenthau, Hans J., 7
- Moscow Conference Declaration, 89
- Mowat, Robert B., 61

INDEX

- Natural resources, as materials of war, 37
- Nazi, 75; *see also* Denazification
- Neutralization, 63, 67
- Nonintervention, 91, 92, 93
- Occupation, bearing cost of maintenance in Germany, 47
- Pan-American Conferences, 75 n.
- Peace: disarmament as prerequisite to, 43; economic factors in, 114-15; indivisibility of, 109; and unity of strong nations, 84
- Peace Conference, 119
- Permanent Court of International Justice, 21-22
- Pink, Gerhard P., 74 n.
- Potter, Pitman B., 8
- Power: diffusion of, 87; institutionalization of, 71-72, 75, 81
- Power politics, 87, 90, 104-5
- Power relationships: effects of French Revolution on, 59; and equality, 17, 64, 68, 80, 91, 92, 93; and Hague Conferences, 67-68; history of, 58-59; and League To Enforce Peace, 70-71; between strong and weak nations, 76, 84, 87
- Production facilities: as reparation, 47-48; and world power, 88
- Quigley, Harold S., 7
- Re-education of enemy countries, 28; reparation as, 43
- Regionalism: and dependent peoples, 85, 94; and security systems, 97, 99; and the United Nations Charter, 95-96, 97
- Reparation, 26, 28, 40, 41-42, 44 ff.; future output as, 50; in kind, 45, 47; labor as, 49, 51-53; outlook for success in, 45-46; production facilities as, 47; seizure of assets as, 48-50; and standard of living, 53
- Roosevelt, Franklin D., 105-6
- Russell, Bertrand, 82
- Salter, J. A. (Sir Arthur), 118 n.
- San Francisco Charter; *see* United Nations Charter
- San Francisco Conference, 20, 57, 77, 81, 83, 111, 123
- Schücking, Walther, 68 n., 69 n.
- Security Council, 80, 88, 96-97, 98, 99, 112, 127
- Security states, 63, 78, 79, 84
- Seizure of assets, in Germany, 48-50
- Senate, Foreign Relations Committee; *see* Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate
- Smuts, Field Marshal, 110-11
- Society of nations; *see* Community of states
- Soong, T. V., 89
- Spengler, Oswald, 89
- Spheres of influence, 88, 103
- Spykman, Nicholas, 104
- Standard of living, 41, 42, 46, 53-54, 114, 115
- Stapleton, Laurence, 18
- Stassen, Commander, 89
- Strategic areas, 99; *see also* Security states
- Sweetser, Arthur, 8
- Taft, Robert A., 129
- Territorial separation, as disarmament, 33-36
- Total war, 31
- Toynbee, Arnold J., 86
- Trade barriers, 113-14, 115

PEACE, SECURITY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

- Truman, President, 57
Trusteeship Council, 97, 98
Trusteeships, 97-98, 100-102, 107
- United Nations, 12, 16, 17, 19, 21, 41, 53, 55, 78, 84, 86, 89, 90, 91, 93, 98, 101, 102, 111, 116, 124
- United Nations Charter: adoption of, a beginning, 128; concrete standards in, 20, 81-82; failure of, to impose limitation of power, 21, 82; importance and future of, 7; and justice, 12, 14, 19, 20, 23; large states exempt from sanctions in, 16; preamble, 11, 93; principle of nonaggrandizement in, 92-93; purposes of, 11, 25; regionalism and spheres of influence provided in, 95-97; security for lesser states in, 17, 23; and Senate Committee hearings, 5-6; social and economic provisions in, 107-10; 116, 121, 123 ff.; and trusteeships, 97-99; and world organization, 116
- United Nations Conference; *see* San Francisco Conference
- United Nations Organization, 5, 25, 79-80, 107, 111, 114, 121, 122, 127, 128
- United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 124, 128
- Van Beek en Donk, Jongheer Dr. B. de Jong, 69 n.
- Vandenburg, Senator, 97
- Vienna Compromise; *see* Compromise of Vienna
- Viner, Jacob, 8
- War criminals: punishment of, 54-55; use of, as reparation labor, 52
- Washington Conference, 72 n.
- Welles, Sumner, 91, 92
- Willkie, Wendell, 85
- Wilson, Woodrow, 70
- World federation; *see* World government
- World government, 22, 87, 89, 111-12
- World organization, 90, 91, 115-16
- World peace; *see* Peace